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ABSTRACT
The belief that malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care quality by
encouraging providers to hide mistakes is the conventional wisdom among patient safety
advocates and scholars. It also provides the normative basis for efforts currently
proceeding at the state and federal levels to curtail medical malpractice exposure. Groups
pressing for tort reform, including the American Medical Association, contend that when
doctors and other providers are insulated from liability, patients will be better protected
from harm.
This article canvasses the evidence bearing on the connection between malpractice
exposure and health care quality. Some of this evidence, such as the Harvard Medical
Practice Study, shows that the quality of health care improves as the risk of being sued
rises; none of it shows that malpractice lawsuits cause the quality of health care to
decline. The widely held belief that fear of malpractice liability impedes efforts to
improve the reliability of health care delivery systems is unfounded.
The central causes of the high error rates that persist in the health care sector appear to be
providers’ defective incentives and professional norms. Providers lose money when
quality improves, and their norms discourage the creation of non-punitive working
environments in which efforts to improve quality can flourish. The “business case for
quality” is missing, and providers attitudes are antithetical to quality improvement. The
tort system’s major deficiency is its failure to subject providers to sufficient economic
pressure to overcome these impediments. The cause of this shortcoming is the rarity with
which injured patients assert legal claims.
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Introduction

Malpractice liability is the scourge of modern medicine.
Physicians defeated polio, smallpox, whooping cough, measles, and
managed care, but the tort system continues to stymie them. Malpractice
premiums in some specialties now exceed $200,000 per year. Premium
spikes in excess of 100% have been reported for physicians who have
never been sued. Demoralized doctors are said to be “going bare,”
relocating, retiring, excluding risky services from their practices, and
hiding their assets. They are also organizing strikes, protests, and “sickouts,” and pressing for state and federal malpractice reforms. The
American Medical Association (AMA) has declared a malpractice “crisis”
in nineteen states, claiming that important health care services are in short
supply.3
Liability insurance costs created the first malpractice “crisis” of the
twenty-first century, but health care providers have other complaints about
the tort system as well. They accuse patients of running to plaintiffs’
lawyers whenever bad outcomes occur, even when providers perform
flawlessly. They accuse greedy trial lawyers of filing frivolous cases to
extort settlements from insurance companies that care more about defense
costs than physicians’ reputations. They criticize the trial process,
claiming that lawsuits last too long, that plaintiffs’ attorneys use emotional
appeals to mislead know-nothing jurors into awarding multi-million dollar
verdicts, and that injured patients wind up with too little compensation
after paying their lawyers’ eye-popping contingent fees.
For years, health care providers even denied the existence of
substandard care. “[T]he profession’s longstanding argument against tort
liability had been that medical errors are few, with litigation resulting
mainly from rabble-rousing by unscrupulous lawyers and expert

3

See American Medical Association, 19 States Now in Full Blown Medical Liability
Crisis, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/6282-7347.html (visited October 31,
2003). See also Michelle Mello, David A. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The New
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 New Eng. J. Med. 2281 (2003). Recent reports by the
General Accounting Office found that premiums have increased for a variety of reasons,
and that many claims of diminished access were false, exaggerated, or the results of
actions not linked to malpractice liability. See General Accounting Office, Medical
Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care (August, 2003)
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf (visited October 30, 2003); General
Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed
to Increased Premium Rates (June 2003) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf
(visited October 30, 2003).
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witnesses.”4 The AMA finally conceded “that medical mistakes happen—
are even common” in 1996, after empirical researchers generated evidence
that could be neither refuted nor dismissed.5
Providers did not abandon their attack on tort liability when the
high social cost of medical errors was proved. They changed their tune.
Instead of denying that errors occur, providers now assert that tort liability
prevents them from improving health care delivery systems by driving
error reports underground. A typical example of this view appears in the
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report “To Err Is Human”: “patient
safety is hindered through the liability system and the threat of malpractice
which discourage the disclosure of errors. The discoverability of data
under legal proceedings encourages silence about errors committed or
observed.”6 This claim has become the conventional wisdom among
public health researchers, doctors, organized medicine, tort reform
advocates, and legal scholars. Writings on patient safety routinely identify
malpractice reform as a critical component of any attempt to improve the
quality of health care. The tort system is always part of the problem –
never part of the solution.
The charge that liability impedes quality improvement is
interesting for a number of reasons. First, it implicitly admits that health
care providers behave in a self-interested fashion.
Punishments
discourage providers from reporting errors because providers do not want
to be punished. The concession is important because health care
professionals typically deny that self-interest influences their decisions.
They style themselves as patients’ advocates and invariably claim to put
patients’ interests ahead of their own.
Once providers admit to being self-interested – particularly in an
area involving quality, a core matter of professional competence – the case
for external oversight of medical professionals strengthens dramatically.
The traditional justification for professional self-regulation is the shared
belief that physicians and other providers can be trusted to act for the
benefit of others. If that expectation is inaccurate – and the medical
profession’s position with regard to patient safety is premised on its
falsehood – then the case for vigorous external regulation becomes
compelling. Courts, state medical boards, ethics committees, and other
administrative bodies should be treating providers much more firmly than
they do.
4

William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, 2003
Health Law Handbook ** (citing Louis J. Regan, Medicine and the Law, New England
Journal of Medicine 1954; 250: 463.).
5
L. O. Prager, Safety-Centered Care, American Medical News 36, No. 26 (May 13,
1996), p. 1.
6
Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 43 (1999).
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Second, the assertion that liability impedes progress on the medical
error front calls into question the broader policy justification of tort law.
Tort scholars believe that liability encourages producers of goods and
services to exercise due care by forcing them to internalize the costs of
their negligence.7 If liability actually discourages vendors from taking due
care by driving errors underground, this analysis must be reconsidered.
Perhaps the standard tort model accurately describes the influence of tort
law in some areas of productive activity but not others. Perhaps it is
wrong across the board. Doctors and nurses are hardly the only tortfeasors
who can hide problems.8 If punishments are bad because they discourage
people from admitting, reporting, and correcting deficiencies, a
comprehensive rollback of tort liability might be in order. Alternatively, if
these arguments are insufficient to justify wholesale reconsideration of tort
law for non-health care defendants, the obvious question is why they
should be credited in the health care context.
Third, as shown below, the best available empirical evidence
indicates that liability for negligence sometimes improves the quality of
health care by motivating providers to do a better job. Consequently, the
charge that negligence liability discourages providers from reporting
errors, drives them from the profession, and has other negative effects
identifies a need for a balanced policy judgment but does not show how
the judgment should be made. The mix and availability of services with
liability may be better or worse than the mix and availability of services
without liability; and the mix and availability of services may vary
depending on the details of how liability determinations are made and
implemented. Because provider quality varies enormously, the possibility
that malpractice liability generates net benefits by driving substandard
providers out of the market cannot be dismissed out of hand. Nor can one
dismiss the possibility that malpractice liability improves outcomes and
lowers costs by channeling patients from low-volume providers to highvolume providers in areas where volume-quality relationships exist.
Because liability can have both good effects and bad ones, a sophisticated
policy assessment will weigh both its costs and its benefits, and not its
costs alone.
7

See e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Liability For Medical Malpractice, in Handbook of
Health Economics, A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, eds., 1343-1350 (2000) (discussing
standard economic analysis of tort law as applied to medical malpractice).
8
Product manufacturers and drug companies can cover up reports of defects and
dangerous side effects. Drivers can lie about their sobriety and their speed. Cigarette
companies can misrepresent their knowledge of the dangerousness and addictiveness of
tobacco products.

6

** L. Rev. ** (2004)

Fourth, the charge that liability slows progress by squelching error
reports is persuasive only if liability is an important impediment in its own
right. If other forces also drive errors underground, a policy decision to
eliminate liability might make things worse by extinguishing the positive
effects of liability without causing more information about errors to
surface. Most calls for reform ignore this problem, even though it is well
known that failures to report errors have multiple causes. The causes
include a culture of perfectionism inside the medical profession that
creates “indelible impressions of fear” by shaming, blaming, and even
humiliating doctors and nurses who make mistakes;9 fragmented delivery
systems that require coordination of multiple independent providers;10 the
prevalence of third party payment systems and administered prices;11
overwork, stress, and burnout;12 information overload;13 doctors’ status as
independent contractors and their desire for professional independence;14
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act;15 a shortage of
nurses;16 underinvestment in technology that can reduce errors,17 and so
9

For detailed descriptions of the harshness with which physicians treat colleagues who
make mistakes, see David Hilfiker, Confronting Our Mistakes, in Susan B. Rubin and
Laurie Zoloth, eds., Margin of Error: The Ethics of Mistakes in the Practice of Medicine
87, 92 (2000); Bryan A Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error:
Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J. L., Med. &
Ethics 346, 348 (2001); Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety through Reducing
Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation between Patient, Physician, and Attorney, 24
S. Ill. U. L. J. 541, 545 (2000).
10
IOM, To Err is Human 2-3 (1999).
11
Id., p. 3; Joseph P. Newhouse, Why Is There a Quality Chasm?, 21 Health Aff. 13
(2002) (describing problems caused by administered prices).
12
Darrell A. Campbell Jr. and Patricia L. Cornett, How Stress and Burnout Produce
Medical Mistakes, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical
Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 37 (2002); Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views
of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 1933
(2002) (finding that 50 percent of doctors surveyed identified overwork, stress, and
fatigue as a very important cause of errors).
13
Joseph P. Newhouse, Why Is There a Quality Chasm?, 21 Health Aff. 13 (2002)
(describing the rate of increase of medical devices, drugs, procedures, and knowledge,
and explaining that physicians have great difficulty keeping up).
14
Liang, supra, at 350.
15
Id., at 353-357.
16
Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical
Errors, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 1933 (2002) (finding that 52 percent of doctors surveyed
identify understaffing of nurses as a very important cause of errors).
17
David M. Studdert, Troyen A. Brennan, and Eric J. Thomas, What Have We Learned
Since the Harvard Medical Practice Study?, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M.
Sutcliffe, eds., Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 3, 21 (2002)
(“U.S. hospitals are almost certainly underspending in their efforts to prevent adverse
events,” including the failure to adopt computerized physician order entry (CPOE)
systems).
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on. Both individually and collectively, these factors have discouraged
providers from implementing proven safety measures and from developing
more reliable delivery systems.18 Given the significance of these factors, it
is naïve to think that error reporting would improve automatically if the
threat of liability were removed.
Finally, most of the tort “reforms” put forward by providers,
professional associations, and lobbying groups would not address the
alleged tendency of liability exposure to impede error reduction. The most
popular proposals (damages caps, credits for payments from collateral
sources, heightened requirements for expert witnesses, and limits on
contingent fees) have more to do with provider self-interest than health
care quality. Their purpose is to reduce insurance costs in the short run,
not to improve delivery systems in ways that address low quality care or
make harmful errors less common.
Fear of liability has little to power to explain the quality problems
that pervade the health care sector. Defective incentives are far more
important. For a variety of reasons, the health care marketplace
discourages providers from taking due care.19
Some payment
arrangements even have the paradoxical effect of making it financially
advantageous for providers to harm patients. Because removing the threat
18

The Veterans Administration spent $478 million over 3 years “to support its national
patient safety initiatives.” GAO, VA Patient Safety: Initiatives Promising but Continued
Progress Requires Culture Change, GAO/T-HEHS-00-167 8 (2000). Even after
spending this mammoth amount, the VA had failed to implement important technologies
like bar code medication administration at all its hospitals and had just begun to create a
voluntary error reporting system. Id. at 5 & 6.
Computerized decision-support technology was predicted to cost Kaiser
Permanente $2 billion over three years. Cathy Tokarski, Medical Error-prevention
Strategies Face Barriers to Acceptance, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
www.ahrq.gov/news/medscap2.htm (May 2000). Dr. Lucian Leape estimates that about
5 million adverse events and near misses occur each year, and observes that the Aviation
Safety Reporting System, the model often touted for health care, costs $70 per error
report to run. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, supra, at 1636-1637,
See Institute of Medicine, supra note *, at 12-13 ("A number of practices have
been shown to reduce errors in the medication process. Several professional and
collaborative organizations interested in patient safety have developed and published
recommendations for safe medication practices, especially for hospitals. Although some
of these recommendations have been implemented, none have been universally adopted
and some are not yet implemented in a majority of hospitals."). See also Id. at 12
(recommendation 8.2: health care organizations should "implement proven medication
safety practices.").
19
These reasons include the prevalence of third party payment arrangements, patients’
ignorance, the difficulty of distinguishing better providers from poorer ones, and timelags between investments and improvements in health. See Part **, infra.
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of malpractice liability would not fix these problems, thoroughgoing tort
reform is more likely to harm health care quality than improve it.
We do not contend that the civil justice system creates optimal
incentives for providers to protect patients from avoidable errors. It does
not and, in all likelihood, it never will. Our point is that unless and until
changes in compensation arrangements create a “business case for
quality,” providers will continue to provide low quality care to many
patients and the health care sector will under-perform the rest of the
economy. We also contend that in the absence of direct economic
incentives for providers to exercise due care, removing liability rights is
likely to make matters worse, not better, by freeing providers to serve their
own interests instead of their patients.
Rather than abolish liability or weaken it to protect the economic
self-interest of providers, a sensible policy strategy would meld the
strengths of the liability- and systems-based approaches to patient safety.
It would ask when and how liability has encouraged providers to develop
more reliable delivery systems, and propose reforms designed to
strengthen this effect. This Article offers some examples showing how
this strategy might work.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II documents the need to
improve delivery systems by summarizing what is known about health
care quality and medical error. Part III describes the conventional wisdom
that medical malpractice liability impedes the improvement of health care
by discouraging health care providers from reporting mistakes and
addressing their causes. Part IV examines the available evidence bearing
on the connection between tort law and health care quality and argues that
malpractice exposure more likely improves the quality of health care than
detracts from it. In other words, Part IV shows that the conventional
wisdom is at best unsupported and at worst wrong. Part V argues that
quality problems are more likely attributable to professional norms and
economic incentives than to liability. Part VI begins the project of
enhancing the quality-improving force of the tort system by examining the
obstacles that currently impede it operation. Part VII suggests some ways
the problems identified in Part VI could be addressed. Part VIII offers a
brief conclusion.
II.

A Primer on Health Care Quality and Medical Error

The medical profession has strong professional norms regarding
the importance of delivering high-quality error-free care. These norms are
inculcated throughout medical school and residency training. Dr. Atul
Gawande aptly captures the basic ethos:
Western medicine is dominated by a single imperative—the
quest for machinelike perfection in the delivery of care.
From the first day of medical training, it is clear that errors
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are unacceptable. . . . [E]very X ray must be tracked down
and every drug dose must be exactly right. No allergy or
previous medical problems can be forgotten, no diagnosis
missed. In the operating room, no movement, no time, no
drop of blood can be wasted.20
Unfortunately, the actual experience of patients diverges
dramatically from the stated goal of “machinelike perfection in the
delivery of care.” The literature on health care quality is replete with
statements that look like tabloid headlines: “one-fourth of hospital deaths
may be preventable;”21 “180,000 people may die” every year “partly as a
result of iatrogenic injury;”22 “one-third of some hospital procedures may
expose patients to risk without improving their health;”23 and “medical
error is the eighth-leading cause of death in the United States.”24 Health
care providers in the United States routinely omit indicated procedures of
known value, frequently perform treatments that are unnecessary and
inefficacious, and employ practice patterns that vary widely and for no
good reason. Adverse drug events are distressingly common.25 Tens of
billions of dollars are spent annually on medical services whose value is
questionable or non-existent. 26
20

Atul Gawande, Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science 38 (2002).
For an excellent review of this book, see Steven Lubet, Like a Surgeon, 88 Cornell L.
Rev. 1178 (2003). For other perspectives on the norms inculcated during residency
training, see Charles Bosk, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure (1979).
21
Robert H. Brook et al., Health System Reform and Quality, 276 JAMA 476 (1996).
22
R.W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why?
109 Annals Internal Med. 582 (1988).
23
Stephen M. Shortell, Charles L. Bennett, and Gayle R. Byck, Assessing the Impact of
Continuous Quality Improvement on Clinical Practice: What It Will Take to Accelerate
Progress, 76 Milbank Quarterly 593, 593 (1998).
24
Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human (1999).
25
David P. Phillips et al, Increase in U.S. Medication-Error Deaths between 1983 and
1993, 351 Lancet 255 (1999); David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in
Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs and Attributable Mortality, 277
JAMA 301 (1997); David W. Bates et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and
Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29 (1995).
26
See Hilfiker, supra, at 90 (“[P]erhaps the most frequent result of physician
misjudgment is the wasting of money, often in large amounts.”); Milt Freudenheim,
Study Finds Inefficiency in Health Care, New York Times, June 11, 2002 (reporting
Juran Institute estimate that “$390 billion per year is being wasted on outmoded and
inefficient medical procedures”); Midwest Business Group on Health, Reducing the
Costs of Poor-Quality Health Care Through Responsible Purchasing Leadership i (2nd
printing, Apr. 2003) (updated version of Juran Institute report contending that “$420
billion spent each year” on poor quality health care); Jonathan Skinner and John E.
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American health care is also dogged by unacceptably high error
rates. In a 1999 report, the IOM concluded that medical errors kill 44,000
– 98,000 Americans and injure hundreds of thousands more every year.27
These errors result in staggering social costs –most of which are borne by
victims and their families. Serious quality problems afflict every aspect of
the American health care system, irrespective of insurance coverage and
delivery arrangements. Simply stated, “quality problems … abound in
American medicine. The majority of these problems are not rare,
unpredictable, or inevitable concomitants of the delivery of complex,
modern health care. Rather, they are frighteningly common, often
predictable, and frequently preventable.”28
Consider hernia repair. This (relatively simple) surgical procedure,
which is one of the “bread and butter” procedures of a general surgery
practice, is performed tens of thousands of times every year in the United
States. Most general surgeons perform several hundred of these
procedures during the course of their careers. The procedure takes
approximately ninety minutes, costs several thousand dollars, and fails
approximately 10-15% of the time. Yet, at a small medical center in
Toronto, hernia repair takes less than half as long, costs half as much, and
has a recurrence rate of only 1%.
The reasons for this extraordinary performance are simple;
physicians at the Toronto clinic “do hernia operations and nothing else.
Each surgeon repairs between six hundred and eight hundred hernias a
year—more than most general surgeons do in a lifetime.”29 Surgery at the
clinic is performed according to a standardized protocol by a specialized
team of experienced personnel. The result is that these surgeons outWennberg, How Much Is Enough? Efficiency and Medicare Spending In The Last Six
Months Of Life, NBER Working Paper 6513 (1998) (finding “no evidence of any
improved outcome (as measured by survival) associated with increased levels of
spending” on elderly Medicare patients in Miami versus lower levels of spending in
Minneapolis).
27
IOM, To Err, supra note **, at 1. These figures have been somewhat controversial.
Researchers have argued that many of the patients would have died anyway, or that
reviewer assessments are unreliable. See Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer,
Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors: Preventability is in the Eye of the
Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415 (2001); Christopher M. Hughes, et al., Deaths Due to Medical
Errors are Exaggerated in Institute if Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000). Those
involved in the preparation of the Institute of Medicine report have defended these
figures. See Lucian Leape, Institute of Medicine medical error figures are not
exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000). But see Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of
Medicine Report on Medical Errors: Can It Do Harm?, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1123
(2000).
28
Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? 76 Milbank Quarterly
565, 566 (1998)
29
Gawande, supra note ** at 38.
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perform all other providers of hernia repair in North America, even though
several have not completed a general surgery residency and the surgeonin-chief is an obstetrician. This extraordinary performance demonstrates
the potential benefits of an undeviating focus on excellence in the
provision of a discrete service or treatment (a “focused factory”).30 These
results also point to a phenomenon that has been observed in numerous
areas of the economy, including health care: the positive relationship
between the volume of services provided and the quality of those services
(volume- quality relationship).
Volume-quality relationships have been documented for a wide
range of medical procedures.31 Consider coronary artery bypass grafting
(CABG), a surgical treatment that approximately 600,000 Americans
receive every year.32 Researchers have long known that high volume
surgeons and hospitals produce significantly better results for CABG
patients than low volume providers. The risk of in-hospital mortality can
vary by a factor of four.33 Yet low volume providers continue to perform
large numbers of CABG procedures, exposing many patients to excessive
30

See generally Regina Herzlinger, Market-Driven Health Care
See Harold S. Luft et al., Hospital Volume, Physician Volume and Patient Outcomes:
Assessing the Evidence 103 fig. 5.1 (Health Admin. Press Perspectives 1990) [hereinafter
Assessing the Evidence]; Edward L. Hannan et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Relationship between In-Hospital Mortality in New York State and the Volume of
Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Surgeries Performed, 27 Health Serv. Res. 517, 535-36
(1992); Herbert R. Karp et al., Carotid Endarterectomy Among Medicare Beneficiaries:
A Statewide Evaluation of Appropriateness and Outcome, 29 Stroke 46, 48 (1998)
(finding that "[t]he mortality and stroke rates [following carotid endarterectomies at]
hospitals with a history of [10 or fewer surgeries] per year was 2.6-fold higher than that
at hospitals performing [50 or more]"); Samuel O. Thier & Annetine C. Gelijns,
Improving Health: The Reason Performance Measurement Matters, 17 Health Aff. 26,
26-27 (1998).
32
See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Challenge and Potential for Assuring
Quality Health Care for the 21st Century, (June 17, 1998), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/21stcena.htm (presenting statistics on CABG utilization)
[hereinafter HHS, The Challenge].
33
Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence 192 (U. Chi. Press 1997)
(noting quadrupling of risk); Kevin Grumbach et al., Regionalization of Cardiac Surgery
in the United States and Canada, 274 JAMA 1282 (1995) (reporting death rates
following cardiac bypass surgery were twice as high at California hospitals performing
fewer than 100 procedures per year than at hospitals performing 500 or more); Edward L.
Hannan, The Relation Between Volume and Outcome in Health Care, 340 New Eng. J.
Med. 1677, 1678 (1999) (noting that, in one study of 1989 data, "the risk-adjusted
mortality rate for patients of surgeons who performed fewer than 50 [bypass operations]
(7.94%) was more than twice the mortality rate for patients of surgeons who performed
150 or more procedures (3.57%)").
31
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risks, and killing an appreciable number of them.34 The problem is not
limited to CABG. A study of patients treated in California in 1997
estimated that more than 600 deaths occurred because patients visited low
volume hospitals for a number of procedures for which volume-quality
relationships had been established, instead of hospitals that performed
these procedures in larger numbers.35
To be sure, quality problems are far broader and more pervasive
than these examples of volume-quality relationships might suggest. As a
1998 literature review summarized matters, the
dominant finding … is that there are large gaps between the
care people should receive and the care they do receive.
This is true for all three types of care—preventive, acute,
and chronic—whether one goes for a check-up, a sore
throat, or diabetic care. It is true whether one looks at
overuse or underuse. It is true in different types of health
care facilities and for different types of health insurance. It
is true for all age groups, from children to the elderly. And
it is true whether one is looking at the whole country or a
single city. . . A simple average of the findings of the
preventive care studies shows that about 50 percent of
people received recommended care. An average of 70
percent … received recommended acute care, and 30
percent received contraindicated acute care. For chronic
conditions, 60 percent received recommended care and 20
percent received contraindicated care.36
The quality problems with American medicine include every conceivable
example of overuse, underuse, misuse, and out-and-out error. Among
hospitalized patients, these problems result in an “epidemic of potentially
preventable iatrogenic death.”37 The Institute of Medicine estimates that
34

See Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence 187 (U. Chi. Press 1997).
See also Kelly Devers & Gigi Y. Liu, Leapfrog Patient-Safety Standards are a Stretch for
Most Hospitals, Center for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 77 (Feb.
2004) (reporting that “only 35.7 percent of hospitals [surveyed] met the Leapfrog
[volume] threshold for coronary artery bypass graft surgery”).
35
R. Adams Dudley et al., Selective Referral to High-Volume Hospitals: Estimating
Potentially Avoidable Deaths, 283 JAMA 1159, 1163 (2000).
36
Mark A. Schuster, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Robert H. Brook, How Good Is the
Quality of Health Care in the United States? 76 Milbank Quarterly 517, 520-21 (1998).
See also Juliette Cubanski and Janet Kline, Improving Health Care Quality: Can Federal
Efforts Lead the Way?, The Commonweath Fund Issue Brief #539 1 (April 2002).
37
The Leapfrog Group contends that “over 160,000 deaths that occur [annually] in the
ICU [intensive care unit] could be avoided” if all urban hospitals implemented its ICU
Physician Staffing Guideline. The Leapfrog Group, Fact Sheet: ICU Physician Staffing 1
(9/02/03). Studdert et al., supra, at 13. Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing
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medical error is the eighth leading cause of death in the United States,
ranking ahead of AIDS, motor vehicle accidents, and breast cancer.
Preventable nosocomial infections are so common that the Centers for
Disease Control estimated that strict adherence to hand-washing
procedures alone would save 20,000 lives every year.38 Non-mortal
injuries occur even more often.39 “[O]ver a million people are injured by
medical treatments annually in the U.S.”40
Mistakes that occur during hospitalizations are only part of the
picture. Additional errors occur during home care, primary care,
ambulatory care, and nursing home care. The frequency of errors in
outpatient settings has not been studied as thoroughly,41 but the available
evidence suggests that outpatient care is subject to many of the same
quality problems that afflict inpatient care.42
Treatment variations are enormous as well, with patients in some
areas receiving far higher and far more expensive levels of care than
others of similar age and physical condition who live elsewhere—with no
effect on outcomes. The result is that “geography is destiny” as far as the
medical treatment one receives is concerned. One group of commentators
estimated that Medicare could buy every Florida beneficiary who agreed
Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 N. Engl. J. Med. 1933 (2002) (finding
that “42% of the public and more than one-third of U.S. doctors say they or their family
members have experienced medical errors in the course of receiving medical care, with
significant percentages reporting serious consequences.”).
38
See
Centers
for
Disease
Control,
Healthy
Hands
USA,
http://www.healthyhandsusa.com/cdc/ (visited October 20, 2003) (“More than two
million Americans contract an infection during hospital stays. Of that group, an
estimated 90,000 die every year from these infections. Up to 20,000 of these deaths
could be prevented by practicing simple hand hygiene procedures, such as those outlined
in the new CDC hand hygiene guideline.”); Michael C. Berens, Infection Epidemic
Carves Deadly Path, Chi. Trib., July 21, 2002, at 1; Atul Gawande, Hand-washing, New
Eng. J. Med. (2004).
39
Although negligence-induced adverse events occur in only about 1 percent of
hospitalizations, the mortality and morbidity figures are enormous because there are more
than 30 million episodes of hospitalization each year. Id. at 20 (reporting 33 million
hospital discharges in 1992).
40
Lucien L. Leape, Forward: Preventing Medical Accidents: Is “Systems Analysis” The
Answer?, 27 Am. J. L. & Med. 145, 146 (2001).
41
See Elizabeth M. Lapetina and Elizabeth M. Armstrong, Preventing Errors In The
Outpatient Setting: A Tale of Three States, 21 Health Aff. 26, 26 (2002) (“little if any
research has focused on errors or adverse events occurring outside of hospital settings”).
42
See Elizabeth A. McGlynn, et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in
the United States, 348 N. Engl. J. Med. 2635 (2003) (studying treatments for twenty-five
conditions, including treatments delivered in ambulatory settings, and finding significant
quality problems).
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to receive Minnesota-style health care a fully loaded Lexus and still come
out ahead.43 The same commentators did a series of studies demonstrating
that patients in high-care, high-cost areas often fare less well than those
who receive less care and consume fewer resources.44
Most of the time, these problems occur not because of isolated
“bad doctors” or because the necessary information is hard to obtain.45
Instead, as one commentator cuttingly noted, “from ulcers to urinary tract
infections, tonsils to organ transplants, back pain to breast cancer, asthma
to arteriosclerosis, the evidence is irrefutable. Tens of thousands of
patients have died or been injured year after year because readily
available information was not used — and is not being used today — to
guide their care.”46
A final problem is the lack of information regarding the absolute
efficacy (let alone the cost-effectiveness) of many diagnostic tests and
medical treatments.47
Manufacturers must provide evidence of
effectiveness to gain regulatory approval for new pharmaceuticals, but no
such requirement applies to medical procedures. Consequently, doctors
can administer treatments that have never been proven to work – and once
these treatments are introduced, they can rapidly become the standard of
care.48 For example, about 300,000 Americans receive arthroscopic knee
43 See John E. Wennberg, Elliott S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the
Debate Over Medicare Reform, Health Aff. Web Exclusive (Feb. 16, 2002)
(demonstrating substantial regional variation in Medicare expenditures and treatment
patterns, without discernable positive effect on outcome or health status), at
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2002/february/geography_and_the_de.php (last visited Sept.
30, 2003).
44
See Elliot Fisher and David Wennberg, The Implications of Regional Variation in
Medicare Spending, Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, Annals of
Internal Medicine 276 (2003); Elliot Fisher and David Wennberg, The Implications of
Regional Variation in Medicare Spending, Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction
with Care, Annals Intern. Med. 293 (2003).
45
Obviously, this generalization has important exceptions. Some bad doctors exist, and
information about best practices is sometimes hard to obtain.
46
Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence: Doctors and Accountability in
the Information Age 353 (1997) (emphasis supplied). The AMA recognizes the
persistence of errors as a problem. See AMA, A Culture of Safety, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/article/3216-6570.html (“According to a recent study from the national
standards-setting organization U.S. Pharmacopeia, while U.S. hospitals and health care
systems have improved their track record of reporting medication errors, they continue to
make the same mistakes over and over. ”)
47
Robert J. Marder, Relationship of Clinical Indicators and Practice Guidelines, 16
Quality Review Bulletin 2: 60, 60 (1990) (discussing lack of evidence showing
effectiveness of many treatments and opining that “[m]uch of the inappropriate use of
technology results from medical uncertainty”).
48
Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 15-16 (“The truth is that many currently ‘standard’
diagnostic and therapeutic practices, involving huge numbers of patients, high risks, and
tremendous costs, rest upon very uncertain foundations with respect to efficacy.”)
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surgery for osteoarthritis annually, at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion per
year. Yet, a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in
2002 found that patients who received the surgery handled tasks like
walking and climbing stairs less well than patients who did not.49 Other
common procedures, such as coronary artery bypass surgery and spinal
fusion surgery, also fail to help many patients who receive them.50 In one
recent high-profile example (bone marrow transplant for advanced breast
cancer), the treatment provided no benefits, and killed an appreciable
number of the women who received it.51
Although hospitals and physicians profess a commitment to
providing high quality care, reality lags far behind rhetoric. There are a
number of reasons why quality is so variable, including the decentralized
and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system, the dominance
of third party payers who have historically cared more about costs than
quality, the tradition of deference to the medical profession to handle
issues of quality, the lack of visibility of the issue for consumers and
politicians, the process through which providers are trained and socialized,
the presence of multiple agency relationships, and the lack of competitive
alternatives to existing coverage and delivery arrangements. The
immediate question, given all these market imperfections, is whether
medical liability makes matters worse by impeding desirable reforms or
exerts pressure to improve by creating incentives to address quality
problems. Part III turns to these issues.
III.

The Conventional Wisdom: Liability Exposure Impedes
Quality Improvement by Discouraging Error Reporting

As noted previously, the conventional wisdom within the health
care sector is that malpractice liability makes it more difficult to address
problems with patient safety and health care quality by restricting the free

49

J. Bruce Moseley et al., A Controlled Trial of Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis
of the Knee, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 81 (July 11, 2002). See also Linda A. Johnson, Study
Finds Common Knee Surgery Doesn’t Work, Associated Press (July 10, 2002).
50
Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 19-20; Richard A. Deyo et al., Spinal-Fusion Surgery—The
Case for Restraint, New Engl. J. Med. 350:7 (Feb. 12, 2004); Abigail Zuger, New Way of
Doctoring: By the Book, New York Times, Dec. 16, 1997 (reporting on study finding
that, although elderly heart attack patients in the U.S. received coronary angioplasty and
bypass surgery almost eight times as often as Canadian patients, survival rates a year
after the heart attack were about the same for both groups).
51
See Michelle Mello & Troyen Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose
Chemotherapy With Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 Health
Affairs 101 (2001).
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flow of information on the subject.52 This criticism is an article of faith
among health policy experts, and it also finds a ready reception among
those who view trial lawyers and the tort system with skepticism or
disdain.53
The conventional wisdom achieved its greatest political saliency in
1999 when the IOM flatly asserted that “liability concerns discourage the
surfacing of errors and communication about how to correct them,” and
that “patient safety is [] hindered through the liability system and the
threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”54 The
IOM repeated the charge in 2001, suggesting that, “alternative approaches
to liability, such as enterprise liability or no-fault compensation, could
produce a legal environment more conducive to uncovering and resolving
quality problems.”55
Provider organizations have used these conclusions to advance
their political agenda of curtailing medical malpractice liability. The
AMA claims to oppose tort regulation because it wants to “creat[e] a
climate where reporting of errors will occur so that the information can be
used to improve the [health care] system and avoid repeating in the
future.”56 The AMA also asserts that “for error reporting systems to be
successful, they must be constructed in a non-punitive manner that

52

See fn. 6 and accompanying text. See also William B. Runciman and Fiona Tito,
Error, Blame, and the Law in Health Care—An Antipodean Perspective, Annals of
Internal Medicine 138:12, 974, 978 (2003) (“Blaming and punishing for the inevitable
errors that will be made by well-intentioned people working in health care drives the
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates those who are best placed to
prevent such problems from recurring.”).
53
See, e.g., Newt Gingrich, Saving Lives & Saving Money: Transforming Health and
Healthcare 125 (2003) (stating that “patient safety is often weakened by possible litigious
implications” of information sharing, citing and quoting To Err is Human); Our Common
Good, http://cgood.org/medicine/item?item_id=3396 (reporting survey results that
“nearly half of all nurses feel prohibited or discouraged from doing what they think is
right for the patient in the way of disclosing and discussing errors because of rules or
protocols set up for liability protection,” and that although doctors recognize that frank
discussions of adverse events with colleagues can help them improve the quality of the
services they deliver, fear of liability discourages them from talking about errors and
thinking of ways to reduce them.); A.M.A., Medical Liability Reform Now! 23 (arguing
that compared with disciplining physicians, “a better approach to the problem of system
errors would be to dispel the fear by physicians, hospitals, and nurses that open
discussion o[f] adverse events would be discoverable in lawsuits”).
54
IOM, supra * at 37. See also id. at 19 (“Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of
errors and communication about how to correct them.”).
55
See IOM, Crossing the Quality Chasm 219 (2001)
56
AMA, Medical Liability Reform: Top 12 Facts and Myths, http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/378/falsehoodsjune2003.doc (visited October 26, 2003).
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provide[s] appropriate confidentiality protections.”57 The AMA’s official
position is that liability has no proper role to play in the regulation of
health care professionals.
Front-line health care providers are quite outspoken in advancing
the conventional wisdom. Beverly Jones, Vice President and Chief
Nursing Officer at the Henry Ford Health System and a former Associate
Dean at the University of Michigan School of Nursing, bluntly described
“[t]he threat of medical malpractice litigation [as] one of the most obvious
barriers to the improvement of safety. . . . [D]isclosing one’s own error or
a colleague’s error poses the risk of financial ruin and loss of professional
credibility. These risks also serve as disincentives to participate in
improvement strategies to reduce the risk of error.”58 Similarly, Dr. Atul
Gawande asserted “[t]he deeper problem with medical malpractice suits is
that by demonizing errors they prevent doctors from acknowledging and
discussing them publicly.”59 These comments represent the views of most
medical professionals. As Professor William Sage observed,
The medical profession by and large heard a single
message from the IOM[‘s report, To Err Is Human]: that
exposed, “punitive” approaches to error detection and
correction are inferior to confidential, cooperative efforts
from within an expert community. Because physicians
regard malpractice litigation as the epitome of punitive,
they viewed the 1999 IOM report as further evidence that
liability should be curtailed. Reasoning that physicians’
fear of lawsuits prevented them from owning up to
mistakes and working to improve quality, they ignored the
historical irony that the profession’s longstanding argument
against tort liability had been that medical errors are few,
with litigation resulting mainly from rabble-rousing by
unscrupulous lawyers and expert witnesses. Even [when]
confronted with irrefutable evidence that errors are
widespread, physicians remain convinced that malpractice
liability has no legitimate role to play in quality

57

AMA, A Culture of Safety, www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/3216-6570.html
(visited Aug. 29, 2003).
58
Beverly Jones, Nurses and the “Code of Silence,” in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 84,
91-92 (2002).
59
Gawande, supra note *, at 37.
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improvement.60

Among academic commentators, agreement is nearly universal that
incident reporting and quality of care will increase only when malpractice
liability is curtailed.61 Professor Brian Liang argues that “current tort law
[] provides strong disincentives to engage in medical error reduction and
patient safety” because doctors who report errors may suffer financially.62
Professor Larry Gostin agrees and asserts that only a public health
approach to malpractice can solve these problems.63 Professor Max
Mehlman contends that “to deter poor quality care you have to identify it
when it occurs, but the threat of punishment prevents doctors from
admitting mistakes, and prevents patients from finding out they have been
victims of malpractice, which prevents the system from figuring out how
to do things better.”64
Professor Troyen Brennan and his various co-authors (who are
responsible for the most comprehensive studies of medical malpractice)
adhere to the conventional wisdom as well. They assert that malpractice
liability “may well stifle efforts to reduce error” because practitioners are
wary “of reporting events that may leave them open to accusations of
negligence.”65 “[T]he specter of litigation currently stands as a major
barrier to the free flow of information about medical errors. Thus,
removing it would align the foci of the compensation and quality
60

William M. Sage, supra note , at .
See, e.g., J.M. Healy et al., Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care
Information, 40 Brandeis L. J. 595 (2002); D. H. Johnson & D. W. Shapiro, The Institute
of Medicine Report on Reducing Medical Error and its Implications for Healthcare
Providers and Attorneys, 12 Health Lawyer 1 (June 2000). Although these points are
usually stated definitively, as shown by statements quoted in the text, some commentators
have offered more qualified claims. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability
Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring Quality, Accounting For Costs, and Coping
With an Evolving Reality In The Health Care Marketplace?, 11 Annals of Health Law
125, 141 (2002) (observing that “current [malpractice] doctrine may well be standing in
the way of (instead of advancing) improvements in quality care, precisely the opposite of
the objective of the traditional tort system.”).
62
Brian Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error, ** J. L. Med. & Ethics
351. See also Brian Liang, Errors in Medicine: Legal Impediments to Reform, 39
(“[P]hysicians with tort liability concerns may be hesitant to report adverse events and
medical errors for fear that plaintiffs’ attorneys will have access to this information, thus
exposing physicians to liability.”).
63
Larry Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical Malpractice as a
Barrier, 283 JAMA 1742 (2000).
64
Case law professor says medical malpractice crisis is the result of an unfair system
http://www.cwru.edu/pubaff/univcomm/2003/8-03/mehlman.htm (visited October 30,
2003).
65
David M. Studdert and Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault”
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 Am. J. L. & Med. 223, 227-228
(2001).
61
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improvement systems and center them on precisely those injuries that are
eradicable.”66 “[T]he moral blame and resulting secrecy of the tort system
are the antitheses of modern quality improvement. Moving to a system
that does not penalize clinicians for reporting adverse events would result
in increased reporting and thus increased institutional learning about how
to avoid errors in the future.”67 In short, “to address the problem of
iatrogenic injuries seriously, we must reform the system of malpractice
litigation.”68
The best evidence of acceptance of the conventional wisdom may
be the dearth of commentary disputing it. Even the authors of this article
once observed that “because malpractice liability and regulatory sanctions
rely on ‘shame and blame’ strategies, they can be counter-productive in
that they drive underground those with the information required to
enhance quality.”69 Professors Timothy Jost and William Sage stand
almost alone in being consistently skeptical. Jost writes that “advocates
[of the conventional wisdom] do not convincingly explain why health care
institutions and professionals will undertake the hard work of looking for
and fixing quality of care problems if they no longer have to worry about
blame and shame.”70 Sage observes that “tort reform is not an intuitive
solution to rampant medical error” and that it is unclear why “the medical
profession, which historically criticized lawyers for inventing medical
errors where none existed, [should] receive even greater protection from
lawyers now that we know errors to be widespread.”71
The view that liability impedes quality improvements by
discouraging error reporting has so many supporters that the decision to
66

Studdert et al., supra, at 28. In Toward a Workable Model, supra, at 228, Studdert and
Brennan write, “[b]oth anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that providers are less
willing to disclose information about errors they make or see when a punitive atmosphere
prevails.”
67
Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1629.
68
Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors: Could It Do
Harm?, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1123-1125 (2000). See also David M. Studdert, Troyen
A. Brennan, and Eric J. Thomas, What Have We Learned Since the Harvard Medical
Practice Study?, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical
Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 3, 7 (2002) (“commentators and
researchers involved in the study of error—many of them clinicians—typically view the
law’s role with disdain.”).
69
Hyman & Silver, ** at **, note **.
70
T. S. Jost, Legal Issues in Quality of Care Oversight in the United States: Recent
Developments, 10 European J. Health L. 11, 19 (2003).
71
William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 Health Affairs 26, 30
(2003). Professor Steven Lubet has also derided the tendency of health care providers to
blame malpractice lawyers for quality problems. Lubet, supra note , at .
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label it the conventional wisdom is apt. Most commentators support the
view without qualification. But is the conventional wisdom true? Part IV
analyzes the evidence bearing on the connection between tort liability and
health care quality to see how closely the conventional wisdom matches
up with existing knowledge.
IV.

What Do We Know about Medical Liability and Patient
Safety?
A.

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS NEVER BEEN
PROVED

Although the conventional wisdom is routinely invoked, it is rarely
accompanied by citations to supporting empirical research. For example,
in To Err Is Human, the IOM offered no empirical support for its assertion
that “patient safety is [] hindered through the liability system and the
threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”72 In
context, the omission is glaring. The IOM report supports the many
statements it contains about the frequency and consequences of medical
errors with extensive citations to studies.73 Evidently, its authors thought
their criticism of negligence liability was too obvious to require support.
Many other writings share this deficiency, asserting that liability impedes
the improvement of health care safety without citing authority showing
that malpractice exposure has a statistically significant effect.
The dearth of citations is readily explained. No statistical study
shows an inverse correlation between malpractice exposure and the
frequency of error reporting. Dr. Lucien L. Leape, a strong proponent of
error reporting and a leading advocate for patient safety, recently made
this point in the New England Journal of Medicine, writing that “[t]he fear
of litigation may [] be overblown. No link between [error] reporting and
litigation has ever been demonstrated.”74 Nor does empirical research
show an inverse correlation between the severity of malpractice exposure
and medical error rates–which is what the conventional wisdom would
predict.
Absent any rigorous empirical foundation, the primary basis for the
conventional wisdom is its plausibility. Providers say the fear of liability
harms the quality of health care because it motivates them to hide
mistakes, and the current legal framework does attach penalties to some
errors. However, plausibility is one thing and truth is another. To see this,
72

IOM, supra * at 37. See also id. at 19 (“Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of
errors and communication about how to correct them.”).
73
For example, when asserting that “[h]ealth care is not as safe as it should be,” the IOM
report cites “[a] substantial body of evidence point[ing] to medical errors as a leading
cause of death and injury.” IOM, p. 22.
74
Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 N. Engl. J. Med. 1633, 1635 (2003).
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consider traffic safety, another context where liability rules apply. When
drivers face tort liability, their autonomy is restrained. When they do not,
drivers can act upon their independent judgments more freely. Applied in
this context, the conventional wisdom suggests that relaxing tort laws
would improve traffic safety. The accuracy of this prediction is not selfevident. If tort laws were eliminated, many drivers might choose to drive
dangerously, e.g., by driving exceedingly fast, by driving when
intoxicated, etc., causing safety to decline. Whether tort liability makes
our highways safer or more dangerous is an empirical matter that cannot
be resolved by speculation.
The same is true of the connection between tort liability and health
care quality. Providers may blame the legal system for undesirable
behaviors (i.e., failures to report errors and address shortcomings), but
these behaviors may occur for other reasons. Providers may also fail to
give credit where it is due. By penalizing mistakes, the liability system
may reduce their frequency. The view that punishments discourage
unwanted behaviors is plausible too, after all. Finally, there is a plausible
middle ground as well. Liability rules may encourage providers to take
greater care and discourage them from reporting mistakes. The question
then becomes whether the effect on patient safety is positive or negative
overall.
At the highest level, the critical empirical question is deterrence:
Does liability for negligence have sufficient deterrent effect to justify the
associated transaction costs and dislocations, including but not limited to
those that are part of the conventional wisdom? The Harvard Medical
Practice Study (HMPS) studied this issue extensively.75 The results are
decidedly mixed, but they offer no support for those who argue that
malpractice impedes efforts to protect patients.
The HMPS found an inverse relationship between the magnitude
of the malpractice risk and the rate of negligent injuries, meaning that as
the size of the malpractice risk increased, both the frequency of mistakes
and the frequency of negligence declined.76 Although the finding was not
75

Interestingly, the Harvard team dismissed the corrective justice goals of the tort system
in their original work, although the subject has reappeared in recent scholarship by the
team. Compare Mello & Brennan, supra note **, at 54-55 with Measure of Malpractice,
supra note **, at 78 (“the value of individualistic corrective justice as a guiding norm for
medical liability is no longer very relevant in a world in which the burden of liability is
distributed to the broader community through the interplay of malpractice insurance and
health care insurance.”)
76
Michelle Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, at 1610 (quoting Paul C. Weiler et al., A
Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 129) (“the malpractice risk variable was negatively
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statistically significant, the HMPS investigators nonetheless concluded
that “the litigation system seems to protect many patients from being
injured in the first place. . . Since prevention before the fact is generally
preferable to compensation after the fact, the apparent injury prevention
effect must be an important factor in the debate about the future of the
malpractice litigation system.”77 The HMPS also demonstrated that
patients who were the least likely to sue – the aged and the poor – were
the most likely to be negligently injured, precisely the result predicted by a
standard model of deterrence. Finally, the HMPS found that the
experience of being sued “made [doctors] twice as likely to take more time
in explaining the risks of treatment to their patients,” precisely the
opposite of the effect predicted by patient safety advocates who argue that
malpractice liability discourages candor.78 Not surprisingly, the HMPS
report recommends that policymakers accept and act on the “indication . .
. that malpractice litigation does have an injury prevention effect.”79
As the HMPS team readily admits, the evidence of deterrence they
uncovered, although the best available, is both “limited” and “subject to

associated with the proportion of hospitalizations involving adverse events and the
proportion of adverse events involving negligence, [but] the association did not achieve
statistical significance at the conventional level. The HMPS investigators struggled with
how to interpret these results and ultimately settled on this conclusion: ‘Although we did
observe the hypothesized relationship in our sample—the more tort claims, the fewer
negligent injuries—we cannot exclude the possibility that this relationship was
coincidental rather than causal.’”) See also Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial
90 (1991) (suggesting that the HMPS found “only a fairly modest, though statistically
significant, preventive effect of malpractice litigation is discernible in [the] data.”)
Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 131 (finding that “tort liability cut the
frequency of negligence-related injuries by 29 percent per hospital admission and cut the
overall rate of medical injuries per admission by 11 percent.”).
77
Id., at 133.
78
Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 127.
79
Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 132. In the face of daunting
methodological challenges, the HMPS team made several subsequent attempts to model
the deterrent effects of medical liability, using four different measures of malpractice
risk, two different outcome measures, and two estimation strategies. The team was
unable to agree on the optimal specification of the model and on how to interpret the
results, so they were never published.
The problems included (1) multiple possible measures of service quality, none
of which is clearly superior, that produce different results in regression equations; (2) the
ambiguity of the intensity of service measure that showed a strong correlation between
tort risk and service quality in the HMPS; (3) multiple possible measures of malpractice
risk that yield different results in regression equations; (4) confounding variables, such as
the hospital-specific case-mix, that HMPS was unable to control for; (5) the enormous
burden of extracting data on adverse events and negligence from hospital files; and (6)
the endogeneity of claim rates and error rates, each of which may influence the other.
See Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1609-1615.
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methodological criticism.”80 In particular, as they note, the “injury
prevention effect” may be stronger than they found it to be because
“constraints on the data set combined to reduce rather than enhance the
likelihood that such a causal connection would manifest itself.”81 Yet, all
things considered, the evidence of deterrence is surprisingly tenuous,
given the salience of malpractice exposure to physicians and other health
care providers who, if survey responses are to be believed, “alter[] their
behavior in rendering clinical care” because of it.82 Often-heard
complaints about “defensive medicine” only make sense if providers
actually are deterred (in fact, only if they are over-deterred) by the risk of
liability.
For current purposes, the more significant point is that none of the
empirical evidence generated by the HMPS supports the conventional
wisdom that malpractice liability undermines health care quality. No
study has shown that exposure to liability has a statistically significant
negative effect on the frequency of error reports. No study has shown that
liability exposure causes health care quality to decline overall. Instead,
the best available evidence shows that liability makes a modest positive
contribution to patient safety. The available empirical evidence does not
support the definitive and unqualified claims made by patient safety
advocates and other critics of the tort system.
B.

TORT LIABILITY AND ANESTHESIA SAFETY: A
POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP

Patient safety advocates often use the history of anesthesia to
demonstrate that health care providers can greatly reduce the frequency of
iatrogenic injuries by making delivery systems more impervious to human
errors and mechanical problems.83 As it happens, the example also shows
that tort liability can motivate providers to identify shortcomings in
delivery systems and correct them. Anesthesia
the practice area in
which the systems-based approach to patient safety has been applied with
the greatest success
actually undercuts the conventional wisdom.

80

Id.
Id.
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Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to U.S. Reform, 24 J. Health
Pol. Pol’y & L. 27, 31 (1999) (citing authorities); Our Common Good, supra at ** (“In
summary, it is clear that the practice of medicine and the delivery of medical care are
significantly influenced and shaped by fear of malpractice claims.”)
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See, e.g., Leape, supra note , at ; Don Berwick, supra note , at ; Gawande, supra
note , at .
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Malpractice lawsuits made it advantageous for anesthesiologists and find
and address the causes of mistakes.
Surgical anesthesia once exposed patients to serious risks of injury
and death. Studies conducted in the middle of the 20th century put the
mortality rate from anesthesia anywhere from 1 in 852 administrations to
1 in 6,048,84 meaning that 2,000 to 10,000 anesthesia-related deaths
occurred per year, about half of which were preventable.85 Anesthesia
mishaps also exposed physicians to serious malpractice risks because the
injuries patients suffered were exceptionally severe and they had no preexisting relationship with the anesthesiologist to temper their willingness
to bring suit.86 Today, by contrast, anesthesia is exceptionally safe. In
approximately a decade, mortality rates fell from 1 in 10,000-20,000
administrations to 1 in 200,000, a ten- to twenty- fold improvement.87
As anesthesia became safer, lawsuits against anesthesiologists
became less frequent. In Massachusetts, claims for hypoxic injury, which
were extremely expensive, disappeared in 1988, when virtually all
anesthesiologists started using pulse oximetry and capnography.88 Deaths
and permanent brain injuries from anesthesia mishaps constituted a
diminishing fraction of claims,89 and far fewer claims resulted in insurance
payouts.90 The fraction of total medical malpractice insurance costs
attributable to anesthesia-related claims fell from 11 percent to 3.6 percent
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over fifteen years.91 “[A]nesthesia medical liability premiums also
declined significantly.”92 The Controlled Risk Insurance Company
reduced premiums for anesthesiologists at Harvard hospitals from $17,690
to $11,750 in one year.93 “The 2002 average premium was $18,000—
about the same as in 1985 and much lower than for other specialties.”94
Anesthesia’s high level of reliability distinguishes it as the only
medical practice area that approaches industrial standards of quality.95 For
this reason, patient safety advocates routinely use anesthesia to show the
gains that can be made by improving health care delivery systems. By
studying closed insurance claims and other records, anesthesiologists
discovered that human errors caused an extremely large fraction of
anesthesia-related injuries.96 They then redesigned their procedures and
tools so that fewer errors would occur and so that errors were less likely to
harm patients. For example, they shortened residents’ hours, promulgated
practice guidelines, mandated the use of safety precautions, standardized
the operation of machines, and outfitted machines with safety devices.
The rates of morbidity and mortality associated with surgical anesthesia
fell drastically. Today, adverse events and emergencies are so rare that
91
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anesthesiologists have to practice on simulators, including computerdriven mannequins, to gain experience with them.97
Much of the credit for improving anesthesia safety belongs to the
American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). In 1983, it launched a
patient safety campaign that included the creation of a Committee on
Patient Safety and Risk Management, sponsorship of an international
symposium on anesthesia morbidity and mortality, and initiation of a
study of malpractice claims closed by insurance companies that continues
to this day. The campaign eventually generated a set of mandatory
anesthesia patient monitoring standards, which the ASA adopted in 1985.
Why did the ASA act when it did?98 According to Ellison C.
Pierce, Jr., the leader of the patient safety campaign, “two major factors”
forced the organization’s hand: malpractice claims and negative publicity.
“Anesthesiology [malpractice] premiums were … among the very
highest—in many areas, two to three times the average cost for all
physicians. By the early 1980s, anesthesiologists recognized that
something drastic had to be done if they were going to be able to continue
to be insured.” Matters became especially dire after “April 22, 1982,
when ABC [television] broadcast … ‘The Deep Sleep, 6,000 Will Die or
Suffer Brain Damage[,]’ … which described a number of anesthesia
mishaps that appeared to have been preventable. The reaction of the
public was strong; for months after the broadcast, patients appearing in the
operating room for anesthesia had questions about its safety.”99
Decisive pressure to protect patients thus came from outside the
medical profession, not from within it. Practicing anesthesiologists tended
to minimize the frequency and severity of errors and to oppose reforms.
Dr. Pierce is candid about this fact. He reports that he and other
physicians had long known that many or even most anesthesia-related
deaths and injuries were preventable but had done little to stem the tide.
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He also identifies professional resistance to practice guidelines as a serious
impediment to patient safety.
What were the challenges? Clearly, it was obvious that
many, if not most, physicians resented being told what to
do. This, of course, was true in all of medicine, from the
early guidelines in cardiology concerning emergency
treatment of a myocardial infarction to the listing of
indications for carotid artery surgery. It was assumed by
many practitioners that any guidelines or standards would
be fodder for the plaintiff’s attorneys. This, of course, has
not been the case.100
As the last two lines suggest, practicing anesthesiologists also blamed
their woes on lawyers who represented malpractice plaintiffs. Such
behavior is well documented, and not restricted to anesthesiologists.101
Until the 1980s, anesthesiologists made important but insufficient
efforts to study the frequency of anesthesia mishaps, to identify their
causes, and to establish treatment guidelines and take other prophylactic
steps.102 The ASA succeeded in dragging a reluctant profession into the
future of patient safety only because, after two insurance “crises” and a
hostile television program, the cost of ignoring quality problems was
unacceptably high. “[H]ospitals and physicians [became] increasingly
aware of the need to reduce and control those mishaps and iatrogenic
events that are preventable … in part [because of] the dramatic rise in
medical malpractices claims and suits in the United States.”103 By leading
its members instead of following them, the ASA protected millions of
patients from harm and thousands of anesthesiologists from malpractice
claims.
The ASA’s actions cast serious doubt on the conventional wisdom
that malpractice lawsuits impede error reduction. Anesthesiologists
figured out how to prevent errors from harming patients because of
100
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malpractice exposure, not in spite of it.104 When they did so, lawsuits
tailed off because uninjured patients had no reason to sue.
Case studies also show direct connections between liability and
improved delivery systems for anesthesia. In one reported incident, a
patient died because an anesthesiology resident accidentally turned off the
oxygen supply instead of the nitrous oxide supply. The hospital’s risk
managers immediately revealed the error, settled the claim, and assembled
a team to investigate the cause of the mistake. The team found that the
machine involved was a British model that both “differed significantly
from other anesthesia machines in use at the hospital” and had no “built-in
fail-safe or alarm systems.”105 Hospital administrators removed the
machine from service, reviewed the hospital’s policy on the use of oxygen
analyzers, replaced older machines with newer models, and saw that all
machines had alarms that sounded when the mixture of oxygen and nitrous
oxide was unsafe. All this activity occurred after the malpractice
settlement, not before it.
The history of anesthesia safety describes a feedback loop running
between litigation and service quality. When errors are frequent or have
serious consequences for patients, lawsuits are brought, saddling providers
with higher costs in the form of judgments, settlements, legal fees, and
(mainly) higher insurance premiums. Providers tolerate these costs until it
becomes cheaper for them to improve quality than to deal with claims.
They then figure out what is wrong with their delivery systems and
improve them. As quality rises and errors diminish, consumers litigate
less often and insurance premiums and other liability costs fall. Fred
Cheney, the former Chair of the ASA Committee on Professional
Liability, understood the feedback loop perfectly: “The relationship of
patient safety to malpractice insurance premiums was easy to predict. If
patients were not injured, they would not sue, and if the payout for
anesthesia-related patient injury could be reduced, then insurance rates
should follow.”106
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Recent developments raise concern that some doctors have
forgotten Cheney’s wisdom. Many elective surgeries that once took place
in hospitals under the supervision of trained anesthetists now occur in
physicians’ offices without them. “Between 1992 and 1999 office-based
liposuction increased 389 percent; breast augmentation, 413 percent; and
eyelid surgery, 139 percent.”107 Forty-one thousand office-based surgical
facilities performed twenty percent of all elective surgeries in 2000,
including 37 percent of cosmetic procedures and 28 percent of
reconstructive plastic surgery.108
Because physicians’ offices are
essentially unregulated, many solo practitioners perform these surgeries
without the assistance of anesthesiologists. Some contend that this
exposes patients to excessive risks.
The Florida Society of
Anesthesiologists—an interested group, admittedly—asserts that “[t]he
national rate for anesthesia-related deaths in outpatient surgery is about 1
in 400,000[, b]ut in Florida the rate is about 1 in 8,500 for office
surgeries.”109 If office-based anesthesia is, in fact, so dangerous, lawsuits
may be needed to motivate solo practitioners to improve their
performance.
C.

THE HISTORY OF DISCLOSURE AND MEDICAL
LIABILITY IN THE U.S.

Malpractice lawsuits were almost unheard of before the 1840s.
They were a common species of litigation by that century’s end, however,
and during the 1900s their frequency rose dramatically.110 If the
conventional wisdom is right, one might expect providers’ willingness to
discuss medical errors to reflect this change. That is, one might expect
providers to have become more reluctant to identify and reveal errors over
time. They should have investigated mistakes and talked about them
freely when malpractice lawsuits were rare, and they should have become
ever more tight-lipped as litigation became common. In the “golden age
of medicine” before the malpractice era, open communication about errors
and related matters like treatment risks should have been the norm.
107
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The history of physician disclosure does not support this
hypothesis. As Professor Steven Lubet writes,
Forgive me if I appear cynical, but is it really fair to blame
malpractice lawyers for physicians’ unwillingness to tell
patients about mistakes? Was there ever a golden age,
before rampant malpractice litigation, when doctors
communicated freely with their patients, openly
acknowledging errors and confronting mistakes in the spirit
of humble cooperation? I don’t think so. Neither does Dr.
Jay Katz, who wrote The Silent World of Doctor and
Patient in the 1980s, long before the current flood of
malpractice cases. If anything, the days before the
malpractice explosion were characterized by less
communication from doctors, who then routinely refused to
acknowledge even the possibility of uncertainty.111
In fairness to proponents of the conventional wisdom, Dr. Katz
focused on the historical failure of physicians to disclose risks, including
the risk of error, before performing medical procedures. He did not
discuss the frequency or content of communications that occurred between
doctors and patients after medical procedures injured patients. Yet, it is
impossible to read his book and not think, as Professor Lubet does, that ex
post conversations about such matters were rare, and that they rarely
included candid disclosures of errors or negligence. Dr. Katz’s thesis is
that physicians wanted patients to trust them blindly and used silence
about all technical aspects of treatment to achieve this goal. It would be
remarkable if a practice of full and candid disclosure of errors ex post coexisted with one of near silence on all matters ex ante. Dr. Katz’s
observation that physicians maintained power over patients by donning a
“mask of infallibility” makes the combination seem extremely unlikely.112
If malpractice litigation did cause the demise of a practice of
complete disclosure of mistakes ex post, one would also expect to find
mention of this in historical writings on the medical profession. The
leading works on the early history of malpractice litigation are by
Professors James Mohr and Kenneth Allen De Ville.113 A search of their
111
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writings turned up no indication that physicians once freely investigated
errors and disclosed them to patients, but stopped doing so for fear of
malpractice liability. The omission is telling because these scholars spend
many pages explaining the effects malpractice lawsuits did have on
doctors’ practices. For example, they caused doctors to ask patients for
liability waivers and bonds, to avoid patients (mainly the working class
and the poor) who were thought likely to sue, to pressure other physicians
to refrain from testifying as expert witnesses, and to lobby state legislators
for reforms. Yet, neither Professor Mohr nor Professor De Ville asserts
that malpractice lawsuits ended a practice of discussing errors candidly.
To the contrary, both scholars contend that doctors frequently
failed to deflate patients’ rising expectations by explaining the limits of
their knowledge and technologies. A few physicians showed patients
frequency tables of poor outcomes associated with procedures like
amputation and bone-setting, but most did not. A nineteenth century
treatise admonished surgeons to “be honest with their patients, apprising
them of the difficulties of the case and the uncertainties of perfect results. .
. They should be candid in regard to their deficiencies, claiming no more
than they can perform, no more knowledge than they possess.”114 The
advice was needed because many members of the profession engaged in
puffery.
Mohr and De Ville also document the medical profession’s history
of denying errors, of demonizing malpractice plaintiffs and their lawyers,
of conspiring to make it hard for plaintiffs to find expert witnesses, and of
threatening to leave patients in the lurch by abandoning their practices.
Thus, the consistent record of the medical profession is to oppose attempts
to impose accountability, whether for bad outcomes or for inadequate
disclosure of risks. As such, it is hard to credit the claim that physicians at
one time were enthusiastically communicating with their patients. It is
equally hard to believe physicians would begin doing so if the risk of
liability were lifted.
If anything, medical liability has encouraged better ex ante
communication about risks and benefits and fuller ex post communication
of mistakes. The AMA’s 1847 Code of Medical Ethics required doctors to
withhold information that might undermine patients’ confidence, such as
uncertainty about the right course of action or the existence of divergent
opinions.115 Judicial decisions imposing legal liability for the failure to
obtain informed consent led to a change in this rule and fostered greater
114
115
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candor.116 The Principles of Medical Ethics, adopted by the AMA in 1980
and supplemented thereafter, now explicitly recognize the importance of
obtaining informed consent, and (revealingly) specify that the requirement
to do so “is based on ‘social policy’ generated by forces outside the
medical profession.”117
The AMA’s modern ethical guidelines also require physicians to
disclose mistakes,118 as do the modern rules governing nurses119 and
hospitals.120 Disclosure does not always occur and fear of malpractice
liability may affect its frequency or comprehensiveness. Even so, the rise
of malpractice litigation as a social phenomenon preceded the
development of disclosure requirements and account for their
promulgation.
Medical professionals and medical societies are
consistently behind the curve. They have never led the charge to provide
information about risks and errors to patients.
D.

COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES

One can also assess the merits of the conventional wisdom through
a comparative law lens. If the prevailing view is correct, countries where
malpractice suits are relatively rare should have fewer medical errors and
higher levels of communication about errors than the U.S. The U.K. is
one such country. It has dramatically lower rates of malpractice
litigation121 and offers physicians dramatically lower malpractice
premiums.122 Those who espouse the conventional wisdom should
therefore predict better handling of errors in the U.K. than the U.S.
116
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Comparative data on error rates in the two countries are scarce,
partly because the study of health care quality in the U.K. is in its
infancy.123 This itself raises questions about the conventional wisdom.
Given the rarity of malpractice litigation in the U.K., why aren’t health
care providers there gathering error-related data routinely (or even as often
as providers in the U.S.)? Official publications acknowledge that error
rates in the U.K. have not been studied with care. They also state that
under-reporting of errors is widespread.124 Given the relative infrequency
of malpractice lawsuits in the U.K., other forces must account for this.
The evidence that is available suggests that, insofar as error rates
are concerned, the U.K. looks much like the U.S. In 2000, the Chief
Medical Officer of the National Health Service (NHS) estimated that
850,000 serious adverse health care events occur in NHS hospitals each
year, half of which are thought to be preventable.125 Medication errors are
thought to “account[] for around a quarter of the incidents which threaten
patient safety in each country.”126 Whether the subject is inappropriate
coronary angiography, coronary bypass grafts,127 or anesthesia mortality,128
error rates in the two countries seem to be about the same.129
malpractice premiums of £195 for doctors and £75 for dentists, with no price
differentiation by practice area).
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When it comes to communication, physicians in the U.K. are
disinclined to admit medical errors or discuss them with patients even
though they face much lower risks of malpractice suits.130 At hospitals that
formally mandate error reporting, between one-third and one-half of all
patients were not informed that errors had taken place.131 Physicians in the
NHS also have created a “culture of blame” and “have avoided the tough
questions of how safety is to become more central to their thinking and
behaviour.”132 None of this evidence suggests that malpractice litigation
stifles a natural tendency to report medical mistakes.133
E.

DISCLOSURE AND ERROR REPORTING BY
SPECIALTY, LOCATION, AND TYPE OF ERROR

The consequences of medical errors range from no harm to minor
short-term inconveniences to major injuries to death. If the conventional
wisdom were accurate, one might expect considerable variation in the
willingness of health care providers to disclose and report errors,
depending on the risks of litigation and the associated stakes. For
example, one might expect providers to report and disclose errors more
often when injuries are minor or when patients are elderly, poor, or
otherwise ineligible for large damage awards. Similarly, it is clear that the
risks of malpractice liability vary systematically based on a provider’s
specialty and geographic location. One might also expect the frequency of
disclosure and error reporting to vary inversely with these risks.134 We
have found no evidence that the predicted patterns prevail.
Medical errors come in three types: adverse events, no-harm
events, and near misses. An adverse event is one in which an error harms
a patient. For example, a patient with a known allergy may be given a
drug that triggers an allergic response, and thus injures the patient. In a
no-harm event, a mistake is made but a patient avoids injury as a matter of
130
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luck or chance. For example, a contraindicated treatment is provided, but
the patient does not suffer the expected adverse consequences. A near
miss occurs when a mistake is made but is caught before treatment occurs.
For example, a doctor may prescribe a drug that should be withheld from a
patient but the hospital’s pharmacist may catch the error and refuse to
dispense it.
No-harm events and near misses occur much more frequently than
adverse events and are important sources of information about the
reliability of health care delivery systems.135 For this reason, researchers
emphasize the importance of learning about them, studying them, and
correcting them.136 Because these errors do not injure patients, no harm
events and near misses are not potential sources of malpractice liability
and are less likely to provoke feelings of guilt or shame. Evaluations of
these mistakes also are less likely to be tainted by hindsight bias, which
may cause negligence to be found more often when patients are known to
have suffered.137
Because providers face no liability for no-harm events and near
misses, if the conventional wisdom were correct, one would expect
providers to report them, study them, and address them aggressively. In
fact, providers appear to give near misses and no-harm events less
attention than adverse events, which they also rarely report.138
Consider a salient anecdote.
Dr. Michael Leonard, an
anesthesiologist and chief of surgery for Kaiser Permanente in Denver,
accidentally gave a patient a paralyzing agent instead of the reversal agent
he meant to administer. The drugs were kept side by side in the same
drawer and had similar packaging. Dr. Leonard simply reached into the
drawer and grabbed the wrong one. Fortunately, the paralyzing agent did
not harm the patient. When Dr. Leonard discussed the blunder with his
partners, he learned that four of five had previously made the same
mistake. None of the other physicians thought to volunteer this
information or to devise a systemic solution, even though no liability was
135
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involved. Only when Dr. Leonard took the initiative did a hospital
pharmacist change the label on the paralyzing agent and put it in a
separate drawer.139
More systematic research confirms this pattern. A survey by the
Institute for Safe Medication Practices found that “it is more likely for
staff to report errors that actually reach the patient and cause harm” than
for staff members to report other mistakes.140 The number of respondents
who thought it “very likely” that practitioners would report harmless
errors ranged from a high of 30 percent for “[e]rrors that reach the patient
but cause no harm” to a low of 8 percent for “[p]otentially hazardous
situations that could lead to an error.”141 Simply stated, “most errors and
safety issues go undetected and unreported, both externally and within
health care organizations.”142
A similar dynamic operates with regard to “old” errors. Providers
could learn a great deal about the origins of errors by studying patients’
charts, as public health researchers have.143 If liability were an important
impediment to this approach, providers could focus on records sufficiently
dated that the statute of limitations has run. The literature on medical
malpractice and patient safety provides no indication that hospitals or
other providers have systematically studied “closed” charts.144
There are a variety of reasons why providers might conclude that
review of closed charts is not cost-effective. Chart review is not always
illuminating. Charts may lack contain the information needed to identify
mistakes, and the state of medical science can change before the statute of
limitations runs. Providers may be satisfied their concurrent review
practices adequately handle the problem.
The more important point is that, once again, the risk of liability
turns out to be a relatively unimportant factor in the decision-making of
individual providers. As such, one should not expect the elimination or
restriction of liability to have much of an effect on the patient safety
efforts of individual providers. In short, when it comes to preventing
providers from addressing medical error, tort liability has neither bark nor
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bite.145 One should not expect providers to report, study, or address noharm events and near misses more fully if tort liability were eliminated or
restricted than they do today.
F.

DISCLOSURE AND ERROR REPORTING BY
PROVIDERS THAT ARE EXEMPT FROM TORT
LIABILITY

If the conventional wisdom were accurate, one might expect to
find cultures of safety, good communication, and superior commitments to
quality in practice areas where doctors, nurses, and other individuals do
not face any malpractice suits. One such place is the Veterans Health
Administration (VHA), which runs 173 medical centers, more than 771
ambulatory care facilities and clinics, 134 nursing homes, and many other
operations. The VHA served more than 3.4 million veterans in 1998.146
Veterans who are injured during treatment can sue the VHA under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),147 but they cannot sue doctors or
nurses who are VHA employees.148 These veterans also receive free
remedial treatments, and many receive monthly disability stipends as well.
Veterans suffering iatrogenic injuries can obtain these benefits without
proving fault.
Because the FTCA precludes individual provider liability, the
conventional wisdom leads one to predict that the VHA would have high
levels of error reporting and a continuous strong commitment to quality.
History paints a very different picture. Although VHA facilities have
improved remarkably in recent years, for decades they suffered the same
shortcomings in the areas of data collection and analysis, systems
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improvement, and service quality as other institutions.149 When patients
were injured, VHA hospitals made “no organized effort . . . to standardize
or track the notification of affected patients.”150 Moreover, recent quality
improvements have resulted mainly from pressure by politicians,
administrators, and external reviewers. Health care professionals within
the VHA did not exert significant influence. Even today, a punitive and
fear-inspiring “shame and blame” culture permeates the VHA, despite the
complete absence of malpractice risk for individual providers.
Worse still, until quite recently, VHA hospitals had “long [been]
notorious for serious lapses in medical safety.”151 During the 1970s and
1980s, official reports indicated the existence of significant quality
problems in facilities serving veterans’ health care needs. For example, a
1985 GAO report found numerous, serious deficiencies in VHA
performance and monitoring of quality assurance activities.152 Congress
issued its own critical report on the quality of care rendered by the VHA
that year.153 Dissatisfied with the efforts of the VHA to improve care,
Congress enacted legislation requiring the compilation and analysis of
“mortality and morbidity data for surgical programs, and selected VAMC
data for specific surgical procedures.”154 Congress also directed the GAO
to evaluate error reporting within the VHA. In 1987, the GAO issued a
report finding that VHA facilities were significantly under-reporting
patient incidents.155
In the late 1980s and 1990s, these developments led to increased
external oversight of the VHA, a series of reports by the VHA affirming
its commitment to quality, and several reorganizations of VHA offices
responsible for quality assurance.
The VHA also instituted a
149
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comprehensive risk management program requiring disclosure of medical
errors to patients.156
These recent efforts are paying off. Reports on adverse drug
reactions and other medical errors have increased dramatically.157 VHA
facilities, which scored below other hospitals in JCAHO ratings until
1990, obtained higher scores than other hospitals during 1991-93 and
equal scores thereafter.158 VHA’s re-engineered systems improved its
performance so greatly that, in 2000, VHA outperformed hospitals serving
Medicare FFS patients on 12 of 13 quality indicators.159 Although VHA
facilities continue to have problems,160 in some respects they are now
leaders in quality assurance.161
156
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The improvements in service quality at VHA facilities are
impressive and laudable. By and large, however, forces outside the VHA
and VHA administrators brought them about. The medical professionals
within the VHA simply failed to address the quality problems in the
system. There is even evidence that they continue to resist the adoption of
patient safety measures that were forced upon the VHA by a fed-up
Congress.162
VHA medical professionals faced no tort liability for negligence,
but they did not spontaneously create a culture in which doctors and
nurses routinely reported errors and worked hard to develop better
delivery systems. Congress, the public, the press, and certain VHA
administrators were the quality watchdogs.163 Indeed, the medical
interactions. VHA has also advanced the practice of using “predictive models [of] riskadjusted surgical outcomes as a means for assessing quality of surgical care. . . . This
data enables VHA clinicians to more accurately determine when both poor and
exceptional outcomes are the direct result of a surgical team’s skill and competence.
162
As the GAO noted,
VHA top managers need to recognize and appreciate the fact that the
several QM [quality management] processes and methodologies, and
the strong centralized QM oversight and control that VHA adopted in
the period from 1985 to 1995, were developed in response to
Congressional and public perceptions that VA did not practice sound
and effective patient care. These perceptions were based on the reality
of a few very seriously flawed cases that prevailing VHA QM
processes failed to recognize or address.”
GAO, VA Patient Safety: Initiatives Promising but Continued Progress Requires Culture
Change, GAO/T-HEHS-00-167 5 (2000). In 1997, OIG observed that consistent
implementation of VHA QM policies by clinicians “has always been, and continues to
be, a problem. Inconsistent and ineffective policy adherence, plus the failure to use the
latest available information to improve systems, render policies ineffective and create the
impression that QM efforts are wasted.” In testimony delivered to Congress in 2000, the
GAO reported, “VA will face significant challenges to ensure the success of its patient
safety effort. In particular, establishing a culture of safety . . . will require sustained
commitment to effect permanent change.” A follow up letter identified the problem more
precisely:
VA needs to overcome obstacles that impede the move from a “blame
and shame” way of handling adverse events to a culture of safety that
looks openly at how and why adverse events occur and how systems
can be improved to prevent them in the future. . . . VA must convey
the message to all its employees that patient safety is everyone’s
responsibility. . . .
The GAO closed its letter by noting that the VA would soon survey its employees to
learn whether they felt “safe enough to report adverse events.” GAO, Response to
Questions from Hearing on Patient Safety and Quality of Care at VA Facilities, supra,
pp. 3-4.
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professionals working in VHA facilities created a long-lasting punitive
culture that discouraged transparency, error reporting and disclosure.164
The existence and persistence of this culture in the absence of personal
legal liability for mistakes undermine the conventional wisdom’s claim
that malpractice exposure poisons a well that would otherwise be pure.
G.

DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND LIABILITY

Proponents of the conventional wisdom often cite “defensive
medicine” as an example of the tendency of tort liability to degrade health
care quality. Defensive medicine occurs when a provider orders a test or
procedure that has little or no utility for a patient solely to reduce the risk
of a lawsuit.165 Doctors, medical societies, insurers, and tort reform groups
argue that the defensive medicine is widespread.166 Common Good, an
organization that opposes the use of courts to regulate physicians,
contends that defensive medicine costs more than $100 billion per year.167
The empirical evidence supporting claims of defensive medicine is
far from conclusive, and it appears that Common Good’s claims are
grossly exaggerated.168 “Most defensive medicine studies have failed to
demonstrate any real impact on medical practice arising from higher
malpractice premiums."169 In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office
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studied Medicare patients treated for a broad range of conditions. It
“failed to find any impact of state tort laws on medical spending.”170
The difficulty of proving that malpractice exposure generates a
particular level of defensive medicine arises because providers may have
many reasons for performing “unnecessary” tests and procedures,
including greater risk-aversion, a difference of opinion as to comparative
utility, and the desire to generate income. As such, it is problematic to
blame the liability system as the sole cause of spending on unnecessary
procedures and tests.
An alternative formulation of the defensive medicine claim argues
that malpractice liability and high insurance premiums cause providers to
abandon high-risk specialties and to flee states with pro-patient tort
regimes. For example, the AMA contends that family physicians are
refusing to deliver babies and that access crises exist in 19 states.171
Again, the supporting evidence is shaky. A 2003 GAO report found
isolated examples of access problems in some rural areas, but it also found
that Medicare patients continued to receive high-risk procedures at stable
or rising rates in so-called “crisis” states.172 Moreover, even if evidence of
significant access denials existed, it would show only that the tort system,
mediated through the cost of malpractice coverage, has a deterrent effect.
A reduction in service availability could mean that inferior providers are
leaving a field. The assertion that access reductions are always bad rests
on an unarticulated (and indefensible) assumption that providers have an
absolute and unrestricted right to determine the scope and location of their
practices.
Finally, if one assumes for the sake of argument that defensive
medicine and physician flight are genuine problems, the conventional
wisdom seems less persuasive, not more. The conventional wisdom
denies that tort punishments deter providers from making mistakes. Yet,
complaints about defensive medicine and physician flight make sense only
if providers respond to punishments rationally, that is, by avoiding them.
But if providers are rational, they should also seek to avoid liability by
reducing both the frequency of errors and the severity of the harm errors
170
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cause. The defensive medicine critique of tort liability assumes that
rational providers respond to liability risks only by taking steps that harm
patients. This is implausible.173
If tort reformers were genuinely worried about defensive medicine
and genuinely desired to prevent it, they would offer vastly different
proposals from the ones they now endorse. For example, a concern about
unnecessary tests and procedures might lead them to call for evidencebased treatment guidelines specifying that certain tests need not be
performed. A concern about impaired access might lead them to propose
premium subsidies for obstetricians and other providers in high-risk
fields.174 Instead, tort reformers propose caps on non-economic damages
and contingent fees, federal reforms, and other measures that are poorly
adapted to the problems of defensive medicine and provider flight.175 It is
particularly hard to reconcile the complaint that providers are fleeing proplaintiff states with calls for tort reform at the federal level.
H.

ACTUAL PRACTICES OF DISCOVERING AND
DISCLOSING ERRORS

The conventional wisdom posits that liability encourages providers
to ignore errors and to hide mistakes of which they become aware.
Ignorance and secrecy are said to be dominant strategies because they
shield providers from liability.176 Ignorance and secrecy can either reduce
the likelihood that patients will learn about errors and sue or make it
harder for patients to establish causation.
Ignorance and secrecy certainly are possible responses to liability
risks, but they are not the only choices available. Investigation and
disclosure are options as well.177 These alternatives also come in various
degrees. Consider disclosure. One can reveal an error to one’s
173
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colleagues, to one’s patient, or to both. One can be candid and lay out
everything one knows, or one can be strategic and say only certain things.
One can admit error and apologize, admit error but not apologize, or
apologize but not admit error. Finally, when disclosing, one can offer or
not offer compensation, and one can be more or less generous when doing
the former. In practice, providers vary tremendously in their choice of
strategy.
In a survey of risk managers at a random sample of hospitals,
“[v]irtually all . . . reported disclosing harms to patients at least some of
the time, and 80 percent had disclosure policies in place or under
development.”178 Fifty-four percent of the respondents said their hospitals
routinely told patients or their families when patients were harmed by
care. Only five percent of risk managers said their hospitals never
disclosed mistakes.179
Hospitals also varied tremendously in what they disclosed. The
most common elements were an explanation, an undertaking to investigate
the incident, an apology, and acknowledgement of harm. Relatively few
respondents reported that a typical disclosure included a declaration of
responsibility for the harm or a promise to share investigation results with
the patients or their families. However, 17% of the respondents indicated
that disclosures at their hospitals routinely included both a declaration of
responsibility and a promise to share the results of any investigation with
the patient. A majority of hospitals also waived the costs of treatment
associated with the error, but few offered compensation or referrals to
support groups, regulatory agencies, or lawyers.180
Disclosure to co-workers is also frequent. A study of physicians in
training found that “[m]istakes were discussed in attending rounds in 57%
of cases and at the morning report or morbidity and mortality conference
in 31% of cases.”181 One of the seminal books on medical sociology
focuses on how error is formally and informally recognized, discussed,
and addressed in a surgical residency training program.182
The frequency of disclosure belies the assertion that, in the face of
liability risks, secrecy is the only viable course. The diversity of existing
practices shows that deciding how to respond to errors and liability risks is
not a simple matter. Risk managers appear to have widely varying ideas
178
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about the optimal approach.183 The statement “liability causes providers to
do X,” is obviously a dramatic over-simplification of what occurs in the
real world.
A growing body of evidence also suggests that hiding mistakes is
not necessarily cost-minimizing. Providers that discuss mistakes with
patients openly and forthrightly may get sued less often than providers that
hide them.184 As Professor Haavi Morreim has noted, “often, the strongest
predictor of whether a physician will be sued is the extent to which
patients feel they are being treated with honesty, respect, and personal
interest.”185
Consider the experience of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in
Lexington, Kentucky. “In 1987, after losing two malpractice judgments
totaling more than $1.5 million,” risk managers adopted a new policy of
identifying and investigating accidents and incidents of malpractice.186
The policy included a practice of disclosing substandard conduct even
when patients and their caregivers neither knew about it nor would likely
have discovered it on their own. Hospital employees even tracked down
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discharged patients, gave them the facts, and “persuade[d] the occasional
reluctant victim to accept financial compensation.”187
This disclosure practice constituted a complete reversal of the
Lexington facility’s prior method of responding to medical errors, which
“was an adversarial combination of little disclosure and much
opposition.”188 It is also noteworthy for two other reasons: the practice
was unique among VHA facilities when adopted, and it did not precipitate
a liability crisis. To the contrary, although the number of claims
increased—an obvious implication of a policy to reveal mishaps patients
would not have learned about by other means—the policy saved money
overall by enabling the Lexington facility to resolve claims much more
cheaply than other VA facilities.189 Other hospitals have adopted similarly
expansive disclosure strategies with similarly positive results.190 These
reports find support in studies suggesting that patients who are dealt with
openly and honestly are less likely to sue.191
Businesses outside the health care industry have had analogous
experiences. In 1991, the Toro Company, a manufacturer of lawncare
products, switched from a strategy of defending all claims aggressively to
a less confrontational approach. By 1996, the average lifespan of its cases
had dropped from 24 months to 4 months, average payouts had fallen from
$68,368 to $18,594, average costs and fees had gone from $47,252 to
$12,023, and average total cost per claim had declined from $115,620 to
$30,617.192 Reflecting the improvement, Toro’s liability carrier reduced
its premiums by $1.8 million over three years. Overall, the conciliatory
approach saved Toro an estimated $75 million between 1992 and 1999.
A practice of dealing with errors honestly and forthrightly may be
less expensive than a policy of hiding them, but Professor Brian Liang
contends that this option is not available to insured providers. He bases
this conclusion on the fact that medical malpractice policies typically
require policyholders to refrain from making statements and taking other
actions that would undermine carriers’ ability to defend claims. Liang
187
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argues that this requirement means that providers jeopardize their
coverage by dealing with errors openly and forthrightly.193
If Liang is right, the desire to maintain insurance coverage creates
a strong disincentive for disclosure. However, although his analysis
sounds plausible, Liang cites no cases in which insurers disclaimed
coverage for the reason he identifies. Because many hospitals disclose
errors routinely – and some disclose them extensively – one would expect
to find at least one such case if any existed. Similarly, one would expect
to find evidence of adverse insurer behavior (including reservation of
rights letters) in continuing education materials aimed at medical
malpractice and insurance lawyers. We were unable to locate any
instances of such behavior by liability insurers – suggesting that the
“problem” is more theoretical than real.
Liang’s argument also omits an important step. It is far from clear
that courts would allow insurance carriers to disclaim coverage when
providers disclose mistakes. JCAHO accreditation standards, ethics rules
governing medical professionals, and some state laws require disclosures.
These requirements, which insurance companies know about when writing
coverage, embody important public policies. Courts could easily conclude
that public policy considerations prohibit carriers from withdrawing
coverage when providers tell patients about mistakes.
In sum, the conventional wisdom dramatically oversimplifies and
overstates the relationship between liability and secrecy. Neither liability
itself nor related insurance concerns inevitably drive providers to hide
errors. Many providers hide or ignore mistakes, but many also disclose
them, and disclosures come in varying degrees of comprehensiveness.
Secrecy may be a strategy some providers chose, but others have opted for
honesty and openness, with good results. This diversity of disclosure
strategies suggests that liability is not a substantial factor driving secrecy.
The decision to communicate or keep quiet is a strategy choice that the
existence of tort liability, standing alone, may have little power to explain.
I.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

The conventional wisdom is that medical malpractice liability
impedes the improvement of health care quality by discouraging providers
from reporting mistakes. Although it is widely accepted, the conventional
wisdom has little support. No empirical study has yielded a negative
correlation between the intensity of the malpractice risk and the frequency
193
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of error reporting. Nor has any study shown that liability correlates
inversely with health care quality. The authors of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study reached the opposite conclusion, finding that liability deters
errors and protects patients with some frequency.
A good deal of other evidence undermines the conventional
wisdom as well. Anecdotal reports show that lawsuits sometimes
motivate providers to address long-standing problems and that high
malpractice premiums account for dramatic improvements in anesthesia
safety. Lawsuits appear to have increased communication between
physicians and patients about treatment risks by creating the doctrine of
informed consent.
Lawsuit also appear to have encouraged
communication about errors, by causing professional and industry
associations to promulgate guidelines requiring disclosure.
Error
reporting is not more frequent in the U.K. than the U.S., even though
malpractice suits are far more common in the latter. If anything, systems
for gathering information about errors and health care quality are more
developed in the U.S., suggesting that liability and provider interest in
errors correlate positively. Reports of near misses and no harm events are
rare even though these mistakes do not saddle providers with liability.
Under-reporting and a punitive practice culture were serious problems at
VHA hospitals, even though the FTCA protected doctors and nurses who
work there from malpractice suits. Finally, the diversity of disclosure
practices prevailing at hospitals across the U.S. shows that secrecy is not
the only plausible response to liability. Providers may even fare better by
disclosing errors than by hiding them.
In sum, the case for the conventional wisdom has not been made
and the best available evidence actually undermines the conventional
wisdom. The view that liability exposure hinders quality improvement by
driving errors underground has been accepted uncritically. When
considered carefully, it is no more plausible, and is, in fact, less plausible,
then the assertion that liability protects patients by deterring mistakes.
If the liability system is not responsible for the continuing failure
of providers to improve health care quality, what is? And why is the
positive impact of tort law on health care quality so weak? Parts V and VI
address these questions.
V.

Professional Norms and Economic Incentives as Causes of
Quality Problems

The existence of high error rates in health care should surprise no
one. High error rates are predictable whenever human beings provide
services via complex delivery systems. Human beings routinely make
mistakes – even when they exercise due care. Health care systems are
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exceptionally complicated.194 Consequently, the many frailties that afflict
human behavior—including sensory limitations, flawed decision heuristics
and empirical theories, information overload, emotions and other
distractions, fatigue and other physical problems, defective motivations,
training limitations, and forces beyond human control—have ample room
to operate. The result is that mistakes are inevitable in the delivery of
health care services.195
The surprising thing, in the health care sector and elsewhere, is that
consistent high-quality performance ever occurs. Errors are inevitable, but
error detection, correction, and prevention are not. All three activities
require continuous commitment, money, and hard work. Yet, many
industries outside the health care sector have brought error rates under
control. They have designed delivery systems that achieve “six sigma”
levels of quality, where defects occur fewer than four times in every
million opportunities.
Transporting the error rates that are common in the health care
sector to other commercial settings dramatizes the strides other industries
have made.
If the performance of certain high-reliability industries,
whose standards of excellence we take for granted,
suddenly deteriorated to the level of most health care
services, some astounding results would occur. At a defect
rate of 20 percent, which occurs in the use of antibiotics for
colds, the credit card industry would make daily mistakes
on nine million transactions; banks would deposit 36
million checks in the wrong accounts every day; and deaths
from airplane crashes would increase one thousand-fold.196
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An error rate of 20 percent would be intolerable in the business settings
identified, but error rates as high as 70 percent have been observed in
health care.
High error rates should be intolerable in health care. Providers
have hundreds of millions of opportunities to deliver health care services
every year. A one percent error rate means millions of mistakes, many of
which have significant potential to harm patients. The history of
anesthesia safety shows that health care providers can do better.
Significant variations in error rates across providers show this too. It is
therefore natural to ask why health care quality is lagging. The question
has several answers, two of which we concentrate on here: professional
norms and economic self-interest.
A.

PROFESSIONAL NORMS OF MEDICINE

To correct errors, one must identify them first. Unfortunately,
errors often hide from view. They can be especially hard to spot when
superior performance can generate bad results and inferior performance
can generate good results. This is true in health care. Many patients die
even when given the best of care, and some patients survive despite
providers’ mistakes. Because neither death nor survival is a perfect
marker for service quality, effort is needed to identify inferior procedures
and mistakes.197
To identify superior procedures and providers, one may have to
conduct statistical studies that aggregate large numbers of patients and
adjust for pre-existing health risks. This was true for CABG providers.
Until studies were run that compared surgeons and cardiac care units and
that adjusted for patients’ physical condition, abnormally high mortality
rates for CABG patients escaped everyone’s attention. CABG providers
attributed negative outcomes to nature until studies forced them to focus
on themselves, their institutional arrangements, and their surgical
procedures.
Health care providers are rarely trained or equipped to identify
iatrogenic injury. Consequently, they often miss mistakes.198 Health care
providers also rarely benchmark their performance against others’.
197
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Consequently, they often think existing rates of mortality and morbidity
are natural and irreducible when they actually reflect inferior performance.
Human frailties exacerbate this tendency. Even when it is clear that
iatrogenic injury occurred and that treatment decisions were erroneous,
health care providers are extraordinarily reluctant to identify these
problems.199 They appear to have a reverse-hindsight bias that causes
them to regard preventable injuries as inevitable. Whatever the cause, the
tendency of providers to underestimate the frequency of iatrogenic injury
is well known.200
Now consider error correction. If people must be trained to
identify mistakes, they must be motivated to report them and address them
as well. Many workers are naturally inclined to ignore mistakes or hide
them. “Errors bring up feelings of shame, and we would rather not
confront the bad feelings associated with our failures as individuals.”201 In
many organizations, including hospitals, workers also face pressures
(having nothing to do with liability) to hide errors and other problems that
come to their attention, and to avoid accepting responsibility or blame.202
Error correction also receives less emphasis than it should because
human beings working in organizations tend to focus on successes.203 A
99% success rate and a 1% failure rate are factually equivalent, but the
psychological implications of focusing one or the other can be profound.
199

Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice at 119.
See Leslie D. Goode, et al., When Is “Good Enough”? The Role and Responsibility of
Physician to Improve Patient Safety, 77 Academic Medicine 947, 949 (2002) (noting
tendency of physicians to “believe that the care they provide is uniformly good and
therefore not in need of change”).
201
Amy C. Edmondson, quoted in Craig Lambert, Obtuse Organizations: Secret Errors
Kill, 103 Harvard Mag. 11 (2001). See also Holzer, supra, at 101 (describing strong
emotional impact accusations of error have on anesthesiologists).
202
Karen Hopper Wruck and Michael C. Jensen, Science, Specific Knowledge, and Total
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Focusing on success rates leads to complacency and self-satisfaction;
focusing on failure rates does not.204 This is why businesses that cannot
afford even one-percent defect rates, businesses like commercial aviation,
banking, information technology, and manufacturing, train employees to
be obsessive about errors.
Yet, the human tendency to focus on successes (of which there are
many in health care) blinds providers (and often the public) to the
magnitude of the problem.205 The 1999 IOM report made the splash it did
because it framed the problem of medical error in terms of failure rates. In
the U.S., it is true both that one can obtain the best available care for most
maladies and that health care errors are the eighth leading cause of death.
The IOM triggered a firestorm of controversy and the creation of several
government commissions by focusing on failures instead of successes.
Medical schools and other training programs for health care
professionals do not teach modern quality assessment and improvement
techniques.206 Instead, they teach students to make independent judgments
and to treasure clinical autonomy. This training may often benefit patients
by supplying them with agents who have the confidence to do what is
right. But professional independence can have a significant downside for
patients as well. A great deal of uncertainty exists about “best” treatments
for clinical conditions, and about the “best” way of performing them. The
efficacy of most medical treatments has never been proved, and many
treatments arguably have upside potential. Many treatments also can be
administered in a variety of ways. Given these uncertainties, independent
medical agents have significant discretion to recommend procedures that
may be sub-par and to implement procedures in sub-optimal ways.
This state of uncertainty gives medical professionals, especially
physicians, considerable freedom and power. Physicians have freedom
because they can form a wide range of judgments. They have power
because patients will rely on their judgments, enabling them to control
enormous resource flows. Efficacy studies, clinical practice guidelines,
and other quality improvement devices are likely to constrain their
204
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judgment and reduce their importance by excluding options and making
the delivery of services more routine.
To put the point another way, although medical schools encourage
doctors to exercise good judgment, they have not focused their efforts on
Total Quality Management or Evidence-based Medicine.207 Instead, they
have historically emphasized self-reliance and inculcated a belief in
hierarchical systems of authority.208 A person taught to act independently
will naturally regard many quality improvement innovations as threats,
especially innovations like evidence-based treatment guidelines and
computerized diagnostic and risk-assessment tools that have demonstrated
their superiority to clinician’s subjective judgments.209 Physicians often
deride such approaches as “cookbook medicine,” and non-physicians have
historically deferred to doctors on quality-related issues.
Cookbook approaches have the singular virtue of squeezing out
inefficient and potentially dangerous individual variation. No airplane
pilot committed to passenger safety (or self-preservation) would complain
about having to practice “cookbook flying” by following a checklist
before taking off.210 Pre-flight checklists, routine maintenance guidelines,
practice with flight simulators, crew resource management training
programs, and other mechanisms that make flying routine save lives. By
using these strategies, commercial airline companies have reduced
accident rates enormously. The accident rate for the U.S. and Canada
exceeded 25 per million departures in 1959. It was less than 1 per million
departures in 1980 and has remained low ever since.211 Now “more than
10 million takeoffs and landings [occur] each year [in the U.S.] with an
average of fewer than four crashes a year,” and there have been years in
207
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which no passengers on U.S. commercial airlines perished because of
accidents during flight.212
Not all pilots supported “cookbook flying” initially. Many resisted
efforts to control their judgment and discretion. Many also interacted with
other members of flight crews in counterproductive ways. “The airline
industry was shocked to realize that well-trained and technically proficient
crews could crash airworthy craft because of failures of human interaction
and communication—areas in which neither training nor formal evaluation
was required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or any other
country’s regulatory agency.”213 The need for training in human
interaction became clear when studies showed that human errors played a
role in 70 percent of airline accidents and “that most of these errors
stemmed from failures in communication, teamwork and decision making
rather than from technical shortcomings.”214
Commercial air
transportation is exceptionally safe today partly because pilots learned to
follow rules and to cooperate with subordinates.
Many health care professionals need to learn how to work for
safety too.215 “A number of observers have noted large-scale obstacles to
promotion of safety culture within healthcare[, including] a pervasive
culture of blame that impedes acknowledgment of error, and professional
‘silos’ that offer unique challenges to changing any universal aspect of
healthcare, including culture.”216 As Ellison Pierce observed when
discussing doctors’ disdain for guidelines, “many, if not most, physicians
resented being told what to do.”217 Medical professionals often resist
212
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efforts to standardize treatments even when shown that guidelines yield
good results.218
The experience of The Leapfrog Group (Leapfrog), an initiative
created by the Business Round Table that comprises more than 150 large
health care payers, indicates the problem. Leapfrog champions three
hospital-based patient-safety practices: computerized physician order entry
(CPOE), evidence-based hospital referral (EHR), and ICU physician
staffing (IPS).219 When a recent survey found that hospitals had made little
progress in implementing these practices, Leapfrog learned that
[h]ospitals’ efforts to meet the three Leapfrog standards
often are seen by physicians as restricting their autonomy
and reducing their productivity and income…. One
hospital respondent captured the general sentiment well,
noting that one of the “fastest ways to the CEO graveyard
is to push physicians too hard and fast on patient safety and
quality improvement.”220
Resistance to guidelines has also slowed the progress of the movement for
evidence-based medicine (EBM), a philosophy that grounds treatments in
the best available studies of effectiveness. It is easier for providers to use
familiar practices than to keep up with the rapidly expanding literature on
health care. Consequently, providers often employ treatments and
procedures that are known to be inefficacious, obsolete, or dangerous.221 It
also is easier for providers to do what others in their communities do than
to base their decisions on science. Consequently, treatment practices often
vary from place to place for no good reason.222
Providers also resist efforts to evaluate the quality of the care they
provide.223 In New York, cardiac surgeons tried to stop the Department of
Health from publishing risk-adjusted mortality rates for CABG providers.
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When they failed, some attempted to “game” the system by reporting that
their patients were sicker (and thus at greater risk of dying) than they
actually were. In Kentucky, providers used their state hospital association
to lobby against an effort by Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield to
benchmark the quality of cardiac surgery units. Anthem had previously
studied cardiac surgery units in Ohio and found a six-fold variation in riskadjusted mortality rates. Public health researchers also report that “health
plans and hospitals that have low quality of care scores often stop
participating in voluntary public reporting efforts.” 224 Evidently, many
hospital administrators prefer hiding problems to revealing them.
Many health care workers also seem to prefer a punitive practice
environment to a non-punitive one. A non-scientific survey conducted by
the Institute for Safe Medication Practices found high percentages of
persons employed in medical facilities who believed that non-punitive
environments increase error rates by tolerating mistakes.225 It should
surprise no one that these attitudes prevail, despite holding back quality
improvement. To achieve remarkable levels of consistency, one must stop
blaming errors on “bad people” and start treating errors as natural and
predictable occurrences that shed light on problems of system design.
Improving systems takes time, effort, and money. Data must be gathered
and studied. Systems must be mapped and sources of errors identified.
Improvements must be designed and implemented. These activities
require personnel training and continuing education, expert consultants,
and new equipment. These activities also require people to confront the
awkward, embarrassing, impolitic, and shameful reality that a mistake has
occurred on their watch.226 Given these costs, many providers have found
it easier to ignore problems, focus on their successes, and hope for the
best.
Modern quality consultants emphasize that errors are opportunities
to improve. They also know that environments in which errors are
identified and analyzed do not arise spontaneously.227 Good attitudes must
224
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be nurtured. Yet, most “physicians lack training in the principles of
quality improvement.”228 Good attitudes must also be recognized and
rewarded. Yet, hospitals and physicians often lose money by improving
quality, as shown further below. Given the training providers do
receive—which inculcates them into a culture of shaming and blaming
people for mistakes—and their incentives—which make errors
profitable—it is surprising that attitudes conducive to patient safety exist
at all.
B.

ECONOMICS

From an economic perspective, the key issue is whether there is a
“business case for quality.” A business case for quality exists when a
provider can earn a profitable financial return on a quality-enhancing
investment.229 The investment may bring in new patients, reduce costs, or
benefit a provider in other ways. Absent a business case, there is no
reason to expect a private provider to bear the cost of improving quality,
even when an improvement is economically efficient and socially
desirable.230
Unfortunately, even when quality improvements are cost-justified
and otherwise desirable overall, the business case for quality often is weak
or nonexistent. This is true largely because of the way health care in the
U.S. is financed and delivered.
Third-party payers underwrite most health care expenses, and third
party payment arrangements create a variety of problems. First, they
cause payers and patients to have inconsistent interests. Payers bear the
bulk of the cost of health care; patients enjoy most of the benefits. Payers
therefore have an incentive to reduce costs at the expense of quality while
patients want ever-higher levels of service even when the marginal
benefits of additional care are far less than the marginal costs.231 Both sets
room by “chang[ing] the staff belief system from ‘good enough’ to a world class
performance mindset, and that “[o]f all the activities, the Belief System Transformation
effort has been the most time consuming, yet vital”).
228
Classen and Kilbridge, supra note , at 966.
229
Sheila Letherman et al., The Business Case for Quality, Case Studies and An Analysis,
22 Health Affs. 17, 18 (2003). Thus, private benefits must exceed private costs.
230
Id., at 17.
231
Judge Richard Posner framed one side of the dynamic in typically blunt fashion:
“[F]rom a short-term financial standpoint--which we do not suggest is the only standpoint
that an HMO is likely to have--the HMO’s incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if
you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical
expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as possible.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).

58

** L. Rev. ** (2004)

of defective incentives contribute to the quality problems that plague the
U.S.
Because payers are more interested in costs than benefits, they
have not historically exerted pressure on providers to improve. This
dynamic has changed somewhat in recent years, partly because employers
lost the battle to control costs directly. When providers and patients
crippled employers’ efforts to use MCOs to control costs, employers
looked for alternatives.232 Some latched onto the mantra of the Total
Quality Management movement that quality improvements save money.233
A movement to measure the quality of care and to track improvements
emerged. However, the movement has enjoyed only partial success, and
the fundamental interest in cost-reduction remains.234
Employers’ focus on costs undoubtedly contributes to the fact that
providers’ compensation is quality-invariant. As outlined previously,
superior providers and inferior providers generally receive similar
payments. In a world where payers care more about expense than quality,
this approach makes sense. Level compensation also meshes well with
providers’ historical preference for fee-for-service compensation over all
other arrangements (and especially over arrangement that condition the
right to payment on the production of measurable results).
Third party payment arrangements also cause problems because
subscriber pools change when patients change employers or health plans.
This turnover is a source of problems when returns on investments in
quality appear long after services are delivered. For example, disease
prevention programs directed at employees in their thirties and forties may
greatly reduce health care costs in employees’ retirement years, but if few
232
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younger employees stay with a company long enough to retire, the savings
to the employer may not justify the cost. When costs are internalized but
benefits are externalized, investments in quality are unlikely to be made.
Case studies confirm these theoretical predictions.235 Employee
turnover and a temporal mismatch between costs and benefits undermined
the financial viability of diabetes case management, smoking cessation
programs, and lipid clinics. Programs beneficial to heart disease patients
and children with asthma encountered serious financial difficulties
because fewer hospitalizations and ER visits, shortened hospital stays, and
reduced use of oxygen and medications meant lower revenues.236 Many
programs suffer because quality improvements do not translate into larger
market shares.237 Researchers supported by the Commonwealth Fund,
which sponsored a series of case studies of cost-efficient quality
improvements, found that “in all cases where the investing organization
[was] a provider, the business case [was] unfavorable.”238
The Leapfrog Group’s experience also is representative. As
mentioned, Leapfrog found that hospitals made little progress
implementing its three preferred patient safety practices—computerized
physician order entry (CPOE), ICU physician staffing, and evidence-based
hospital referral—even though the social benefits of these practices are
known to exceed their social costs. Investigations consistently identified
deficient private incentives as a cause. “CPOE is perceived to be costly
and risky. The hardware and software upgrades needed are expensive and
require significant staff training time, and productivity often declines
during implementation.”239 Similarly, “ICU physician staffing may result
in a loss of hospital revenue under certain circumstances and payment
methods. For example, if health plans do not provide a bonus for
improvement in this area and the hospital is being paid on a discount off
charges or per-diem basis, use of intensivists may result in a loss of
hospital revenue because patients’ length of stay declines. Moreover,
intensivists do not necessarily order more billable services, such as
235

The Commonwealth Fund sponsored an excellent series of studies of the business case
for quality improvements. The reports can be found at www.cmwf.org. The studies
repeatedly find that quality improvements either generate no financial rewards for
providers or, perversely, make providers worse off.
236
Artemis March, The Business Case for Clinical Pathways and Outcomes
Management: A Case Study of the Children’s Hospital and Health Center of San Diego
Field Report #609, The Commonwealth Fund (April 2003).
237
“The consumer voice that might otherwise in theory have shifted payment toward
higher quality was muted, or even silenced.” Id.
238
Id.
239
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diagnostic tests.”240 Finally, “evidence-based hospital referral can lead to
declines in hospital revenue … Four of the six high-risk procedures for
which Leapfrog set volume thresholds are cardiovascular procedures,
which are relatively profitable for hospitals. As a result, hospitals are
reluctant to give up referrals and the associated revenue if they do not
meet the volume thresholds.”241
Those who still doubt that provider self-interest offers a robust
explanation for the current state of affairs should consider the comparative
availability of computerized user-friendly billing programs and
computerized user-friendly clinical treatment programs. Software that
avoids billing errors is readily available and most providers have it. By
contrast, software for clinical treatment programs has lagged. This
outcome is quite predictable from an economic perspective: “[t]he
development of medical applications of information technology has
largely been commercially funded, and reimbursement has rewarded
excellent billing rather than outstanding clinical care. As a result, the
focus has been more on products to improve the ‘back-office’ functions
related to clinical practice than on those that might improve clinical
practice itself.”242
In sum, health care providers have worried less about quality than
they should have because they were not paid to do so.243 Altruism,
education, lofty ethical standards, demanding norms of patient service,
good character, licensure, reputational concerns, desire for referrals, report
cards, and a highly punitive culture have undoubtedly motivated providers
to make many improvements, but they have failed to bring health care up
to industrial standards of quality. Anesthesiologists knew that patient
5
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Id.
Id.
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David W. Bates and Atul A. Gawande, Improving Safety with Information
Technology, 348 New Engl. J. Med. 2526, 2532 (2003). See also Davis, supra, at 41-42
(reporting that manufacturers of machines for delivering anesthesia had the technology
needed to prevent errors but did not incorporate it into their products because “there
[was] no great demand from the anesthesia providers”); Stephanie M. Duberman and
Henrik H. Bendixen, Concepts of Fail-Safe in Anesthetic Practice, in Pierce & Cooper,
eds., at 149, 163 (showing that cost-effective means of preventing anesthesia mishaps
were available and arguing that “improvements in outcome [could] be achieve
inexpensively and simply).
243
See Leatherman et al., supra at 17-18: “[H]ealth care organizations may be reluctant to
implement improvements if better quality is not accompanied by better payment or
improved margins, or at least equal compensation. Without a business case for quality,
we think it unlikely that the private sector will move quickly and reliably to widely adopt
proven quality improvements.”). See also Bill Lewis, New Stents Good for Health, Bad
for Finances, Hospitals Say, Tennessean.com, Aug. 1, 2003 (reporting that hospitals lose
approximate $400 per use of an improved stent because Medicare reimburses less than
the actual cost of the product).
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monitors detected misintubations but did not use them because they were
expensive.244 Hospitals know that computerized physician order entry
systems greatly reduce the frequency of medication mistakes but do not
use them because they are expensive.245 Doctors know that electronic
medical records (EMRs) improve the quality of care, but do not use them
because most independent practices are too small to afford the
technology.246 Few emergency rooms have patient-protecting software
because of limited resource pooling and economies of scale.247 Over and
over again, one finds that providers fail to implement proven patient safety
measures because they lack incentives to bear the cost.248
The absence of a business case for quality explains the infrequency
of error reporting as well. Outside the health care sector, many businesses
have created non-punitive internal working environments that encourage
workers to bring problems to light.249 They have taken this step, despite
facing external liability threats, because the benefits of extremely low
defect levels exceed the costs. Health care providers can create non244

Gawande, supra, at 67.
Doolan & Bates, supra, at 183 (identifying the “[l]ack of financial incentives” as a
significant barrier to the implementation of CPOE and other computerized technologies);
id. (observing that CPOE may actually disadvantage providers in an FFS environment by
reducing hospital lengths-of-stay and numbers of tests performed). See also Institute for
Safe Medication Practices, Patient Safety Survey Results Summary (2003) (reporting that
only 3.3% of 241 responding hospitals had computerized physician order entry systems);
Greg Groeller, New technologies tackle drug errors, Sun-Sentinel.com, Aug. 31, 2003,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/local/orlsubizdrugerrors31083103aug31,0,2697512.story?coll=sfla-business-headlines (indicating
that high cost required hospital to stagger implementation of technologies designed to
reduce medication errors).
246
Richard L. Reece, Improving Care in Independent Practice, HealthLeaders News,
Aug. 25, 2003, http://www.healthleaders.com/news/feature47637.html.
247
Allison Connolly, Brigham study: Emergency rooms slow to embrace IT, Boston
Business J., August 15, 2003.
248
Id. (reporting that only a minority of 241 reporting hospitals met clinical guidelines for
intensive care unit physician staffing or evidence-based hospital referral standards for
high-risk surgeries and neonatal conditions). See also Millenson, The Silence, supra, at
107 (discussing examples in which “a Manhattan teaching hospital” told doctors to
improve their handwriting instead of purchasing a computerized order entry system,
senior administrators at an “affluent suburban Chicago hospital” “remain[ed] silent while
physicians scoff[ed] openly at buying error-reduction technology that [was]
unreimbursed,” and a physician claimed to have “pried an error-reduction budget out of
her hospital by fibbing that they would lose Medicaid funding unless they acted”).
249
See, e.g., Robert L. Helmreich, Managing Human Error in Aviation, Scientific
American 62, 62(May 1997) (stating that an airline that instituted a non-punitive
reporting policy “received more than 5,000 reports from its pilots in 21 months).
245
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punitive environments too, and the few hospitals that have done so have
experienced “striking” increases in the frequency of error reports.250 The
number of such providers is small, however, reflecting the fact that
providers have little to gain. Attempts to blame under-reporting on fears
of litigation sound plausible, but the real problem is that the market forces
operating in the health care sector create little pressure for quality to
improve.
In theory, patients could exert pressure for quality by voting with
their feet. In fact, they have not done so. Outside the health care sector,
businesses that produce sub-par goods and services can expect to suffer
near-death experiences that chasten their managers. Inside the health care
sector, it is the patients who suffer these experiences, not the providers.
This may be because patients cannot easily differentiate between high
quality care (and high quality providers) and low quality care (and low
quality providers). If patients can’t tell the difference, they can neither
reward high quality providers by patronizing them, nor punish low quality
providers by shunning them. Even providers who recognize that they have
a problem and want to invest in quality enhancement can reasonably
anticipate that it will be all pain and no gain.
C.

THE RARITY OF RESULT-BASED COMPENSATION

The documented shortcomings in the health care sector result from
what an economist would describe as a series of principal-agent
problems.251 Doctors, nurses, and other health care providers are agents
that patients engage to provide information and therapeutic services. Yet,
because delivery systems are complex and staffed by fallible human
beings, the risk of inadequate performance is high, as is the risk of harm.
Patients rationally want health care providers to use their superior
knowledge to minimize these risks, but providers are not complying.
250

Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 N. Engl. J. Med. 1633, 1633
(2003) (reporting that “striking increases in internal reporting have been achieved
recently in a few hospitals that implemented nonpunitive and responsive reporting
systems”); Leape, Foreward, supra, p. 146 (stating that by 1999 “leaders in a number of
health care institutions across the country had begun to implement non-punitive
reporting”). The IOM appears to be committed to the position that health care
organizations can create non-punitive environments internally while facing punitive
pressures from without. In To Err Is Human, it both endorsed non-punitive arrangements
and recommended the creation of mandatory error reporting systems that hold providers
accountable “by providing disincentives, such as citations, penalties, or sanctions, for
continuing to engage in unsafe practices.” Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, supra, at
1634. Evidently, external threats need not poison the atmosphere within.
251
The literature on agency problems in health care markets is surveyed in Martin
Gaynor, Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services,
NBER Working Paper No. 4695 (April 1994). See also Mark V. Pauly, Doctors and
Their Workshops 1-16 (1980) (modeling physician behavior in economic agency terms).
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Ordinarily, principals use two methods to encourage agents to
perform well: monitoring and bonding. Bonding involves efforts to tie the
agent’s fate to the principal’s, so that self-interest will motivate the agent
to serve the principal well. Monitoring involves supervision of the agent
by the principal.
Agents operating in the health care sector go to great lengths to
bond with patients. Doctors and nurses receive extensive training,
certifications, and continuing education. They commit themselves to
codes of ethics and subject themselves to perfectionist standards and peer
review. Hospitals operate on a non-profit basis, reducing the incentive to
“cheat on quality.” Providers place great weight on their reputations.
In other industrial sectors, producers do similar things. They
demonstrate commitments to quality by developing brand names, by
obtaining certifications from independent regulators, by agreeing to meet
production deadlines or quotas, and by setting explicit quality standards
and performance targets. Producers operating outside the health care
sector also take a further step: they tie their financial success to their
customers’ satisfaction by offering warranties, money-back guarantees,
inexpensive service contracts, and other emoluments. In other words, they
use compensation arrangements that reward them for meeting quality
specifications and producing good results. Producers do this for a simple
reason: they gain by keeping their customers happy and allaying their
customers’ fears. A world in which disappointed or worried customers
can take their business elsewhere is a world in which competition is a
potent force for quality improvement.
Many service agents use result-based compensation arrangements
(RBCAs) too. Lawyers, salespersons, real estate agents, financial
advisers, auctioneers, and company managers frequently condition their
right to compensation in whole or in part on outcomes, e.g., dollars
recovered for clients, sales volume, prices, returns on investments,
revenues, or stock values.252
The linkage between payment and
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See Hyman & Silver, supra note * at ** (“Lawyers of diverse types work on
contingency, as do many accountants who represent taxpayers before the Internal
Revenue Service and local taxing authorities. Investment bankers, stockbrokers, real
estate agents, auctioneers, department store clerks, insurance agents, advertising agencies,
political consultants, and telemarketers work on commission. So do corporate officers,
directors, and executives who receive stock options, partners who share in a firm’s
profits, employees who receive bonuses, and service personnel who receive tips. Even
salaried employees participate in RBCAs when their pension plans hold their employers’
stock.”)
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performance brings the economic interests of principals and agents into
closer alignment, to their mutual benefit.
Although RBCAs prevail throughout the economy, they are
virtually unknown in the health care sector.253 Of the four most prevalent
compensation arrangements—fee-for-service, flat rate, capitation, and
salary—none ties the right to payment to service quality or patients’
health. All four arrangements are quality-invariant and outcomeindependent. Providers receive the same amount, whether or not they
deliver high quality care.254 Doctors have even used the AMA’s Code of
Medical Ethics to prohibit fee arrangements that link compensation to
results.255
As a general matter, existing compensation arrangements pay
health care providers for what they do, not for what they accomplish.256
This failure to tie compensation to variables that correlate strongly with
patients’ needs and desires has a striking consequence: providers have no
direct economic incentive to deliver high quality medical care.257 In many
253

See R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health
Care, 76 Milbank Q. 649, 654 (1998) ("Linking salaries and bonuses to performance on
quality measures is common in other industries. In the health care industry, however, this
practice has been rare until recently and has not been well studied."). The Department of
Veterans Affairs now uses bonuses and punishments to encourage employees to report
mistakes. See Pear, supra.
254
For example, consider the consequences of a fee-for-service compensation
arrangement. Whether a service helps a patient, harms a patient, or has no effect, a
provider’s payment is the same. FFS therefore creates strong interest conflicts.
Providers can gain by delivering services patients do not need, including services that
expose patients to risks. Providers can maximize profits by minimizing costs, even when
this means sacrificing quality. Providers can make money on procedures that are
outmoded or inefficient. They can even benefit by harming patients and charging for
services needed to undo the damage.
255
See AMA, Code of Medical Ethics [complete cite]; Hyman & Silver [cite articles];
256
David A. Kindig, Purchasing Population Health (1998) (quoting former Assistant
Secretary of Health and Human Services Dr. Philip Lee) (providers “get paid for what we
do, not what we accomplish.”). See also David A. Kindig, Purchasing Population
Health: Aligning Financial Incentives to Improve Health Outcomes, 33 Health Services
Research 223, 223 (1988) (same).
257
See Danzon, supra, at 1348 (observing that FFS compensation “increase[es] the
likelihood of errors of commission” because providers can profit by generating a “high
volume of reimbursable encounters and procedures”). Capitation creates slightly
different incentives, but with similar consequences. “[S]ince the capitated physician
faces a positive marginal cost but receives zero marginal revenue per unit of additional
service or effort, capitation may create incentives for suboptimal quantity and quality of
care if patients have imperfect information about quality or face costs of switching
physicians.” Danzon, supra, at 1348. In an encounter-based compensation system,
providers are paid based on the amount of time spent with a patient, the number of
patients treated, the number and type of procedures performed, the number of weeks
employed, or the number of patients in a practice.
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instances, providers can actually profit by cutting quality at patients’
expense.258 As former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich cuttingly
noted, “healthcare is the only industry in America that can give you a
disease and then charge you to cure the disease it gave you.”259
Payers share responsibility for this state of affairs. Payers have
historically cared more about price than quality, so they have negotiated
terms that largely delegate responsibility for quality to providers.
Although payers have recently become more interested in performancebased compensation arrangements, there are daunting institutional and
political barriers to their adoption.260
Even so, RBCAs have the potential to create the business case for
quality that is so often missing in the health care sector. By forcing
providers to internalize the costs of low quality care and enabling them
capture the benefits of high quality care, RBCAs can spur improvements
in the quality of goods and services.261
RBCAs also have an important information-forcing aspect. As
noted previously, many organizations have hostile internal cultures that
discourage health care workers from reporting and dealing with mistakes.
RBCAs can encourage these organizations to transform themselves by
making their dysfunctional culture more expensive. As soon as employers
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Improving delivery systems can require providers to spend millions or even billions of
dollars. Existing forms of compensation do not encourage them to incur these expenses,
even when the benefits for patients far outweigh the costs to providers.
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Gingrich, supra, at 18. Gingrich, id. at 19, also cites a report showing that “hospitalacquired infections, which are not considered medical errors, are responsible for over
88,000 deaths every year and cost over $4.5 billion.” According to Millenson, supra, at
111, “[t]he medical literature suggests a 50 percent reduction [of hospital-caused
infections] is achievable.”
260
Hyman & Silver, supra note , at .
261
Id., at p. Wruck and Jensen discuss the case of Lincoln Electric, which encouraged
high-quality production by issuing lifetime warrantees and by requiring
employees [to] repair the defects in their output on their own time. . . .
Defects also affect [employees’ annual] bonus[es] directly.
“Forgivable” errors result in the employee losing 1% of his or her total
annual bonus for each such defect. “Unforgivable” errors result in a
loss of 10% of the annual bonus. Although annual total compensation
[at Lincoln Electric] is double the industry average, Lincoln’s
productivity per worker is five to six times its competitors’. . . . Its
monetary pay-for-performance system encourages employees to
improve both productivity and quality and has led it to dominate the
industry
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bestow honors, recognition, and other rewards on employees who find
weaknesses and cure them, good attitudes will take hold and flourish.262
The dearth of RBCAs may also explain why consumer ignorance is
a persistent problem in the health care sector. As stated, principals use
two methods to obtain reliable performance from agents: bonding and
monitoring. Unfortunately, monitoring appears to have little impact on
health care quality, mainly because patients have difficulty assessing the
quality of care they receive.263 The information asymmetry is too great for
patients to overcome.
Health care is far from the only industry in which producers know
more about the quality of goods and services than consumers do. Indeed,
it is difficult to identify any economic sector in which this is not true. Car
companies know more about the reliability of automobiles than buyers do.
Growers, grocers, and restaurateurs know more about the purity of foods
than consumers do. Commercial airlines know more about safety records,
on-time arrival frequencies, and lost luggage problems than passengers do.
Significant informational asymmetries between sellers and buyers are
common.
Markets provide incentives to overcome these asymmetries. Price
and non-price competition creates pressures for sellers to make sure
buyers know where high-quality goods and services can be found.
Consider televisions. If television sets vary in quality, manufacturers of
better sets can profit by charging higher prices or selling more units. For
this strategy to work, consumers must be able to tell good sets from bad
ones, something they cannot naturally do. High-quality sellers have
incentives to invest in the reputation of their brand name and educate
customers. Consumers quickly learn to avoid sellers that withhold
information, or recognize that they are trading off price against quality in
dealing with such sellers.
By comparison to other producers, health care providers say little
about the quality of the goods and services they provide. They rarely
convey information about mortality rates, infection rates, inoculation rates,
wait times, or other matters of interest to patients. They do not benchmark
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Wruck & Jensen, supra, at p.
See Newhouse, supra, at (explaining that because consumers cannot tell whether a
“bad medical outcome is attributable to poor-quality care or to the underlying disease,”
they “continue to use providers or delivery systems that give inferior results”); Gaynor,
supra, at 13-14 (describing asymmetry of information between patient and physician, and
stating that “[q]uality of care (or physician effort in producing care) can be observed far
less precisely by the patient than by the physician, providing the physician with an
opportunity to skimp on quality”).
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themselves against other providers or advertise the results.264 They resist
efforts by others to rank them.265 They do not even provide complete
information about prices in advance. Their silence reflects that the fact
that educating patients has little upside for them.266 RBCAs invert this
dynamic, and create incentives for providers to gather and disclose more
data in order to attract patients and garner the associated economic
rewards.
D.

ALTERNATIVES TO RBCAS

The “reforms” offered by proponents of the conventional wisdom
also demonstrate the need for RBCAs and other sources of incentives to
improve the quality of care. Without exception, critics of liability call for
extensive government financing and regulation of health care providers.267
264

See Wruck & Jensen, supra, at p. (“Many TQM organizations also benchmark,
comparing their performance to data available on the performance of peer or competitor
firms.”).
265
Some first-party health insurers have recently begun to make provider rankings
available to subscribers. Predictably, providers have questioned the value of the rankings
and their accuracy. See Liz Kowalczyk, Online rankings rankle hospitals: Insurers
offering data to consumers, The Boston Globe, March 8, 2004.
266
Stuart M. Butler, A New Policy Framework For Health Care Markets, 23 Health
Affairs 22, 23 (Apr. 2004) (arguing that health care plans offer more information to
subscribers when forced to compete); Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient
Health Care Systems, 23 Health Affairs 25, 25 (Apr. 2004) (contending that health care
purchasers are poorly informed partly because providers “resist[] … the collection and
publication of quality-related information”). Jost, Ariz. L. Rev., supra at 850-855,
emphasizes the severity of the information problems afflicting health care consumers.
We agree that the project of educating patients is demanding and difficult, and we harbor
no illusions of widespread intelligent service selection. But widespread intelligent
selection may not be needed. In most markets, a good deal of free-riding occurs as
unsophisticated shoppers benefit from the producers’ efforts to satisfy the demands of
informed shoppers who seek out the best goods and services at the best prices. Freeriding could also occur in the health care sector if the population of sophisticated patients
was larger. Our point is only that it will become larger if providers are incentivized to
convey more information.
267
See, e.g., Kathleen Covert Kimmel and Joyce Sensmeier, A Technological Approach
to Enhancing Patient Safety, 17 J. Healthc. Inf. Manag. (2003) (“Given the expense of an
electronic medical record system, which includes physician order entry, medication
administration records, and decision support systems, funding from the hospital
supplemented by the federal government is needed. . . . . [T]he government needs to
create a national health information infrastructure as a medical communication highway
to protect its citizens.”); Lapetina, supra, at (recommending that governments require
ambulatory and office-based surgical centers to require accreditations and to mandate the
use of licensed anesthesiologists in certain procedures); id. (“[T]he U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) should mandate that all states create standard of care
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Consider Professor Liang’s self-described “very modest proposal.” He
would “create a patient safety center within the National Institutes of
Health for coordination and study of medical error,” “mandate systemsbased patient safety and error reduction efforts . . . as a condition of
accreditation and licensure of institutional providers,” “mandate systemsbased, patient safety and error reduction, [and] continuing medication
education for individual providers,” “mandate [error] reporting with the
stick of licensure suspension or revocation for nonreporting,” “eliminate []
termination without cause clauses in physician contracts” with employing
health care organizations, separate financial officers from clinicians,
“mandate third party, independent review when physicians and health care
plans conflict in recommendations for patients,” and, apparently, forcibly
That Liang describes his call for extensive
educate patients.268
governmental involvement as “a very modest proposal” shows only that
no one expects providers to achieve appropriate safety levels on their
own.269
The almost reflexive reliance of commentators on governmental
initiatives is easy to understand. Regulations more often drive major
efforts to improve patient safety than market forces. Interviews conducted
as part of the Community Tracking Study confirm this. When accounting
for improvements, hospital administrators and other interviewees cited the
desire to meet JCAHO accreditation requirements more often than other
cause.270 They even gave JCAHO credit for improvements that were not
tied to express JCAHO requirements, such as investments in electronic
medical records and other forms of information technology. These

for office-based surgery and procedures involving anesthesia within a designated number
of years. The standards should address areas including patient monitoring during
procedures, technology implementation, and equipment purchase and maintenance.”);
Doolan & Bates, supra, at (recommending state and federal grants for technology
implementation); Liang, supra note, at 43-44 (stating that “managed care organizations . .
. have no incentive to engage in or fund the significant administrative and clinical costs
associated with error reduction research and implementation”); Bates and Gawande.
268
Liang, supra note , 24 S. Ill. U. L. J. at 561-566. Liang also identifies need for
“internal and industry-wide reporting and analysis systems that continuously monitor
errors and error reduction effectiveness.” Id. at 563. It is not clear from the text whether
he would create these by mandate, too.
269
They should have much less faith in the ability of governments to police health care
quality. Experience with state-run incident reporting systems and medical boards
provides no basis for optimism on this score. See, e.g., Leape, Reporting of Adverse
Events, supra, at 1636 (discussing underfunding and general inactivity of state reporting
systems)
270
See Kelly J. Devers, Hoangmai H. Pham, and Gig Liu, What Is Driving Hospitals’
Patient-Safety Efforts, 23 Health Affairs 103, 105 (Apr. 2004).
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investments were said to be indirect means of helping hospitals meet
requirements that were expressly listed.271
The consensus that government must lead the way is an
unmistakable sign that providers’ incentives are inadequate. No one
expects taxpayers to underwrite quality improvements in computers sold
by Dell or cars sold by General Motors.272 The public expects both
companies (and the private sector more generally) to invest in quality
because doing so is profitable. By offering RBCAs, Dell, General Motors,
and a host of other companies align their interests with those of their
consumers. It is time for health care providers to do the same – and once
they do so, we should fully expect immediate and extensive improvement
in the quality of care they provide.
VIII. Harmonizing the Liability and Patient-Safety Approaches
Patient safety advocates argue that faulty systems cause medical
errors, not bad people. But tort liability blames individuals (and
sometimes entities) for mistakes and holds them accountable for patients’
losses. This is one reason many patient safety advocates believe that tort
liability is detrimental. Because it shames and blames individuals, it is
thought to apply pressure at the wrong points.
Yet, tort liability and patient safety are not completely
incompatible. One can find many anecdotal reports in which malpractice
lawsuits caused providers to address systemic problems they neglected
when left to their own devices.273 The history recounted in Part IV.B.
shows that anesthesiologists revamped their systems and improved their
performance because of tort liability, not in spite of it. And the Harvard
Medical Practice Study found that professional negligence and patient
harm were less likely to occur when injured patients were more likely to
sue. The correct assessment appears to be that tort liability sometimes
motivates providers to improve their performance and their delivery
systems but does so inconsistently and less effectively than is optimal.
271

Id., at 107.
To be sure, technology transfer of government-funded research is another matter
entirely. In general, the U.S. relies on a mix of public and private funding to conduct
basic scientific research. Applied research is more heavily funded by private parties, who
reasonably anticipate garnering an economic return from their investments.
273
See, e.g., Michael J. Berens, Infection Epidemic Carves Deadly Path, Chicago
Tribune,
July,
21,
2002,
www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi0207210272/jul21.story (visited Feb. 5, 2004) (discussing efforts Bridgeport Hospital in
Connecticut made to bring down rates of post-surgical nosocomial infections after a
malpractice lawsuit brought the Hospital’s indifference in the face of a known peril to
light).
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In this Part, we outline several ways of strengthening the tendency
of tort liability to motivate providers to improve their delivery systems.
We begin by setting out a simple theory of how tort liability is supposed to
create incentives for quality improvement. The theory forces one to rethink the criticism that the tort system fails because it targets individuals
instead of systems. The criticism may be right, but not for the reason its
authors contend. We then examine the causes of the tort system’s failure
to generate quality improvements. Finally, we consider ways of
strengthening the tort-based signal to improve.
A.

CREATING INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY: A SIMPLE
THEORY OF COST INTERNALIZATION

Organizations like hospitals and MCOs have the power to improve
delivery systems, but tort law often holds individuals like doctors and
nurses responsible for mistakes. When individual providers “called the
shots,” the decision to impose liability on them was arguably defensible.
Now that organizations are in charge, it seems to makes no sense to hold
individuals responsible for systems they do not control.274
The problem of individual accountability is compounded by
MCOs’ efforts to influence the practice of medicine. Physicians complain
that MCOs prevent them from delivering medical care of the highest
quality and punish them for advocating on behalf of patients. It seems
perverse to hold physicians liable for mishaps resulting from constraints
MCOs impose on them. Freeing MCOs from malpractice liability also
weakens their incentive to improve quality.275 Enthusiasts of the
conventional wisdom aggressively assert that these institutional realities
support their criticisms of the tort system.
Although these points are true in a superficial sense, liability critics
who stress the choice of wrong targets fail to grapple with the Coasean
point that contracts can cure inefficient assignments of liability. If MCOs,
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), hospitals, and other entities
274

Runciman & Tito, supra at 975 (arguing against the application of sanctions to
individuals and contending that “more attention should be given to demanding
organizational compliance with appropriate standards”); Liang, supra note * at **
(“[L]iability rules on the organizational level may also impede error reduction activities .
. . [because they] shield organizations from liability . . ., even though the organization has
designed the incentive structure . . . . This is a direct result of a physician’s independent
contractor status; since the physician is not considered to be under the control of the
organization and has significant discretion over the performance of his or her
responsibilities, the organization, which “merely” pays for services, is generally not liable
for the actions of the independent contract physician . . . .
275
Liang, supra note, at 43-44 (“Further, because managed care organizations do not
generally shoulder liability associated with patient injury, they have no incentive to
engage in or fund the significant administrative and clinical costs associated with error
reduction research and implementation.”)
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can efficiently improve their systems, and if the law incorrectly imposes
responsibility for mishaps on physicians, nothing impedes a contractual
solution that minimizes expected error costs by shifting liability from
physicians to organizations.
Consider an example. Suppose that a doctor employed by an MCO
can efficiently spend $1,000 reducing errors directly, that the doctor faces
a remaining expected liability exposure of $25,000 per year after this
investment is made, and that a liability insurance carrier would charge an
actuarially fair premium of $25,000 to cover the remaining exposure.276
After preventing errors directly and buying insurance, the doctor’s total
cost of dealing with errors is $26,000.
Now suppose the MCO could cut the doctor’s residual liability
exposure from $25,000 to $5,000 by improving its health care delivery
systems at a cost of $10,000. Plainly, the doctor could save money by
paying the MCO $10,000 to make the improvements and by paying a fair
premium of $5,000 to insure the residual risk that would remain. Paying
the MCO to improve would reduce the doctor’s total cost of dealing with
errors to $16,000 ($1,000 + $10,000 + $5,000).
The doctor’s professional liability carrier could accomplish the
same result. Continuing the preceding example, suppose the doctor is
content to pay the $25,000 premium. Instead of accepting the payment
and shouldering the risk, the doctor’s liability carrier would find it
advantageous to pay the MCO to improve its systems. A $10,000
payment to the MCO would save the carrier an expected $20,000 in
liability costs, allowing it to pocket a $10,000 profit.277
Because a liability carrier can pool physicians who practice in the
same hospital or facility, it may also find it advantageous to pay for
improvements that individual physicians would not purchase on their own.
Suppose a $50,000 improvement in a hospital’s operating room would
276

For simplicity, the example assumes that defense costs and claim adjustment expenses
are zero and that liability insurance premiums are tailored to the risks individual
physicians present.
277
Liability insurers have in fact worked to reduce the frequency of malpractice claims.
See, e.g., Office of Technology Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical
Malpractice 33 (1994) (reporting that some malpractice insurers have developed
“mandatory clinical protocols that physicians must follow to maintain coverage”); Liang,
supra note **, 24. S. Ill. U. L. J. at 546-547 (reporting that malpractice carriers require
doctors and hospitals to engage in risk management activities as a condition for obtaining
coverage); Jack Moyers, Does Monitoring Have An Effect on Patient Safety?, 4 J. Clin.
Mon. 110 (1988) (“We now find certain monitors being used [in connection with
anesthesia] because insurance companies, either directly or indirectly, has issued a sort of
ultimatum.”).

72

** L. Rev. ** (2004)

reduce the liability exposure of 100 doctors by $1000 each.278 It would be
irrational for any doctor to pay $50,000 for a $1000 gain, but it would be
advantageous for a carrier covering all 100 doctors to pay $50,000 to save
$100,000. The liability insurer could thus achieve economies of scale that
doctors not formally associated with each other might have difficulty
obtaining on their own.
Completing the triangle, the MCO could step between the doctor
and the liability insurer. By agreeing to indemnify the doctor for
malpractice claims, the MCO could absorb the doctor’s $25,000 expected
liability loss in return for a payment of $25,000, spend $10,000 improving
its systems, pay $5,000 for an insurance policy covering the doctor’s
residual exposure, and pocket $10,000 in cash.279 An MCO could also
perform an aggregating function by implementing practice standards and
other safety enhancements and taxing their costs to all doctors under
contract.280 Examples of such enterprise liability by contract exist in some
areas of the health care marketplace, although there are clearly
transactional and institutional barriers to its universal adoption.281
To summarize, if health care organizations could efficiently reduce
error rates by improving delivery systems, the assignment of tort liability
to individual providers should not impede progress. It should instead
create a bargaining environment in which physicians pay organizations
directly or indirectly to make cost-justified improvements.282 The decision
to saddle individuals with financial responsibility for mishaps should not
be crucial, even if organizations have greater ability to improve health care
delivery systems than they do.
Critics of tort liability nonetheless believe that the decision to
target individuals is an important mistake. If they are right, it can only be
because contractual exchanges are not reassigning liability efficiently.
The difficulty of contracting cannot account for this. Doctors, hospitals,
MCOs, and health care payers already use contracts to regulate many
278

Many safety devices that could be adopted at hospitals and other locations where
doctors practice are likely to fit this description. For example, all clinicians who
prescribe medications in a hospital would benefit from a computerized drug order entry
system. Nurses and the hospital’s pharmacist would benefit too.
279
See Danzon, supra note **, at 1378 (“If enterprise liability is potentially efficient, it
could already be adopted by voluntary contract between hospitals and their medical
staff.”).
280
See Liang, supra note **, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. at 57 (stating that a physician who
contracts with an MCO “subjects himself or herself … to practice and other MCO
requirements, including the use of specific clinical practice guidelines, limitations on care
decisions by management, standards of utilization review,” and other terms).
281
William M. Sage and James M. Jorling, A World That Won’t Stand Still: Enterprise
Liability by Private Contract, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 1007, 1032 (1994).
282
Cf Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1964) (noting importance of placing
liability on cheapest cost avoider, regardless of whether they are parties to the contract).
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aspects of health care delivery, and they have considerable freedom to
reallocate malpractice risks. Patricia Danzon, a leading health economist,
points out that “contract enterprise liability is already the norm in at least
one staff model HMO, in most teaching hospitals and in other contexts
where physicians are salaried hospital employees.”283 Recent premium
spikes appear to have encouraged risk-shifting as well, with “physicians in
many states []seeking coverage from the hospitals with which they are
affiliated.”284
To explain why the decision to target individuals makes a
difference (assuming it does), one must posit defective incentives. That is,
one must show that inefficient assignments of liability “stick” because the
incentives to shift responsibilities to organizations are missing even
though organizations can bear them more efficiently. The next section
shows that defective private incentives may often arise.
B

DEFECTIVE INCENTIVES IMPEDE LIABILITY
TRADES

It should be plain by now that many providers invest fewer
resources in patient safety than they should. The most important
explanation for this is the failure of the health care market to reward
quality improvements. Another is the tort system’s failure to pick up the
slack. The tort system emits a weak and inconsistent signal for quality
improvement.285
The basic reason for this problem is that injured patients rarely sue.
Focusing on hospitalized patients in New York, the HMPS found a 7.5 to
283

See Danzon, supra note **, at 1378. See also Liang, supra note **, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. at 57 (stating that a physician who contracts with an MCO “subjects himself or
herself … to practice and other MCO requirements, including the use of specific clinical
practice guidelines, limitations on care decisions by management, standards of utilization
review,” and other terms).
284
William H. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, supra, at XX.
285
The discussion in this section focuses on the tort system’s impact on errors that injure
patients. Other defects in health care delivery abound but are not generally subjects of
tort litigation. Consider waste. Many medical tests and procedures, such as arthroscopic
knee surgery for patients with osteoarthritis and spinal fusion surgery for patients with
back pain, are of doubtful effectiveness. Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 15-16 (“The truth is
that many currently ‘standard’ diagnostic and therapeutic practices, involving huge
numbers of patients, high risks, and tremendous costs, rest upon very uncertain
foundations with respect to efficacy.”). Ineffective procedures do not trigger malpractice
lawsuits unless they are delivered improperly and patients are harmed. Consequently,
malpractice lawsuits are not means of discouraging waste. On the effectiveness of knee
surgery and spinal fusion surgery, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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1 ratio between negligence-induced adverse events286 and the total number
of medical malpractice claims.287 Approximately 2% of patients whose
injuries stem from negligence file claims, although claiming is more
common when injuries are severe.288 “Even when the injury sample [was]
narrowed to a subset of more monetarily valuable tort claims—those
involving serious injury to patients less than seventy years old—a
negligence-to-claims ratio of 5 to 2 persist[ed].”289 Other studies also find
low claim rates.290
The universe of filed lawsuits also contains a substantial number of
claims, perhaps even a majority, in which no negligence occurred. In
many instances, there was not even an adverse event. Over-claiming—the
assertion of invalid malpractice claims—is, however, dwarfed by underclaiming—the failure to assert valid claims. “[F]or every doctor or
hospital against whom an invalid claim is filed, there are seven valid
claims that go un-filed.”291
Because under-claiming is so widespread, the tort system
predictably fails to send a strong quality-improvement signal.292 To create
optimal incentives, the system would have to transfer 100 percent of the
costs of negligence from patients to providers. In fact, patients and their
first-party health insurers bear the vast majority of the costs of medical

286

An adverse event is an injury caused by medical management (rather than the
underlying disease process) that resulted in either a prolonged hospital stay or disability
at discharge. The judgment that an adverse event had occurred was based on a two-stage
process using implicit standards to conduct a professional review of the medical records.
The studies of New York (1984 hospitalizations) resulted in an adverse event rate of
3.7%. Subsequent studies of Utah and Colorado (1992 hospitalizations) resulted in an
adverse event rate of 2.9% in those states.
287
Studdert et al., supra, at p. 7 (reporting that “[i]n total, approximately 3,600
malpractice claims relating to injury year 1984 were made in New York. A comparison
to the 27,000 negligent adverse events arising in that year produces a negligence-toclaims ratio of 7.5 to 1.”)
288
Studdert et al., supra, at p. 7.
289
Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 70 (noting that “nearly 80
percent (10,026 out of 12,859) of the patients who suffered a negligent injury but did not
sue were either fully recovered from the injury within six months or were more than 70
years old when the injury occurred.”); Danzon, supra, at 1354 (explaining that
malpractice lawsuits rarely occur when patients suffer small injuries).
290
See also Danzon, supra, at 1354-57 (reviewing studies showing that patients injured
by medical negligence rarely sue).
291
Saks, supra note **, at 703.
292
Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1623. See also F. Sloan et al. (page); Weiler et al., A
Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 112 (“To the extent that injured victims systematically
underutilize their tort rights, there is a corresponding reduction in actors’ incentives to
adopt socially optimal precautions against such injuries.”).
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injuries.293 The fraction of the cost borne by providers is far too small to
motivate them to invest as heavily as they should in quality
improvements.294
Even if the tort process had no other defects, under-claiming would
eliminate private incentives to make many socially efficient
improvements. Suppose an MCO could cut the expected costs of
negligently inflicted iatrogenic injuries to patients from $25,000 to $5,000
by investing $7,500 in better health care delivery systems. From an
efficiency perspective, the investment, which saves $12,500 in net
expected injury-related costs, ought to be made. If tort law holds
physicians responsible for negligence, not MCOs, then the MCO will have
no incentive to spend the $7,500 barring the Coasean transactions outlined
previously. Without those transactions, the MCO would bear the cost of
the improvement, but others—patients and doctors—will reap the gains.
Nor, in a world of widespread under-claiming, would doctors find it
economically advantageous to pay the MCO to make the improvement.
Suppose that patients bearing only 13 percent of the injuries sue, the
percentage indicated by a 7.5 to 1 ratio of adverse events to claims. It
would cost doctors $3,250 to compensate these plaintiffs in full, far less
than the $7,500 the improvement would require.
Under-claiming makes it cheaper for providers to tolerate problems
than to fix them.295 Unless settlements and verdicts are “up-weighted” to
reflect this fact – and they are not – providers will necessarily be underdeterred by the tort system.296 Providers will also lack incentives to
reallocate malpractice risks efficiently in many situations.
293

See Randall R. Bovbjerg and Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 53, 60-61 (1998) (“the vast majority of medical injuries
are reimbursed by the first-party coverages, just as are the underlying conditions that
caused patients to seek medical care initially”) (citing Deborah R. Hensler et al.,
Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States (1991)).
294
Poor quality health care of all forms was said to account for roughly $420 billion in
direct medical spending in 2003 and for another $105 to $210 billion in indirect costs,
like reduced business productivity due to employee absenteeism. The total economic
burden imposed by poor quality health care is thus in the neighborhood of $500 to $700
billion. Midwest Business Group on Health, Reducing the Costs of Poor-Quality Health
Care Through Responsible Purchasing Leadership i (2nd printing, Apr. 2003). By
comparison, providers spent about $21 billion on malpractice insurance in 2001.
Insurance
Information
Institute,
Medical
Malpractice
(Sept.
2003),
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/.
295
Under-claiming may be less troubling when punitive damages are available for certain
claims that are brought directly against MCOs.
296
Hyman, supra note * at **. Professor Saks suggests that this “up-weighting” function
is being accomplished indirectly, by terrorizing physicians more generally about the
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Some commentators who assert that malpractice liability impedes
progress by driving errors underground also believe that under-claiming
weakens providers’ incentives to invest in patient safety.297 The
combination of views is odd. Logically, those who espouse the
conventional wisdom should argue that the rarity of malpractice suits
improves health care quality by reducing the frequency and severity of
punishments. If all malpractice victims were to file lawsuits and obtain
compensation, the conventional wisdom would predict a marked decline in
health care quality, as proliferating lawsuits scared providers out of their
wits and fostered unprecedented efforts to hide mistakes. One cannot have
it both ways. Either tort deters (in which case more is better) or it doesn’t
(in which case less is better). Regardless, there is, once again, little
empirical evidence to support the conventional wisdom.
Other problems further dilute the tort system’s deterrent signal.
After patients file malpractice cases, the system does a reasonably good
job of sorting the wheat from the chaff -- a much better job than many
proponents of tort reform suggest. Many studies report high frequencies
of settlement and payment in cases where experts agree that defendants
violated the standard of care and low frequencies when experts agree
otherwise.298 Still, a good job is not a perfect one. Civil justice processes
produce wrong decisions with some frequency, awarding damages to
undeserving claimants and withholding damages when negligence and
injury occurred.299 Many of these mistakes are inevitable. Malpractice
consequences of falling into the clutches of the tort system. See Saks, supra note *, at
1286-87. Professor Saks does not consider the demoralization costs associated with this
strategy, or the anti-tort coalition strategies it encourages.
297
See, e.g., Liang, supra note ** at 567 (arguing that because “fewer than one out of
sixteen patients who are ‘negligently’ injured ever collect a penny from the tort system
…[,] we’re not getting the appropriate effect in terms of maximization of safety and
minimization of error and . . . injury.”).
298
Catherine T. Harris, et al., Placing “Standard of Care” in Context: The Impact of
Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation 4 (2002)
(“Over the past fifteen years, there have been a number of empirical studies of the
medical malpractice claims process. Virtually every one … has concluded that
compensation paid to the plaintiff is closely related to a determination of ‘negligence,’
typically defined in terms of a failure by the defendant physician to meet the relevant
standard of care.”); F.A. Sloan et al, Suing for Malpractice, supra, Chapter 8.; Ralph
Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: the Role of
Standard of Care, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 877, 885-886 (2002) (reporting that “[i]n
100% … of the cases in which the outside reviewers evaluated the defendant-physician as
probably liable, the insurer concluded that the standard of care had been breached,” and
that “money was paid to the plaintiff in 93.1% of the cases” in which the insurer
determined that the standard of case was breached).
299
See, e.g., Cheney et al. (reporting payments in *% of anesthesia-related cases where
reviewing physicians found no negligence). Physicians who are sued when they are not
negligent incur significant financial and reputational costs.
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cases are so complex and subjective that even experts disagree over
correct outcomes an appreciable part of the time.300 Standards of care are
often uncertain as well because evidence of the efficaciousness of
treatments is lacking. Payments are therefore often made or withheld in
many tort cases where educated people could reasonably criticize either
result. As Sloan et al. observe, “[t]o the extent that there is highly
incomplete knowledge about the effect of particular interventions by
health care providers on outcomes, it is unrealistic to expect courts to be
omniscient in this regard.”301
Civil justice processes also frequently over-compensate claimants
with modest injuries and under-compensate claimants whose injuries are
severe. The degree of under-compensation varies directly with the
magnitude of injury, meaning that patients who suffer the worst harms
also endure the most serious compensation shortfalls.302
Undercompensation remains a problem even after payments from collateral
sources are considered.303
These errors add a good deal of “noise” to the signal the tort
system emits.304 The noisier the signal, the less effective it is in
communicating a deterrent signal to health care providers. If providers
perceive they are likely to be held liable for non-negligent care, they are
unlikely to take seriously the “outputs” of the tort system as indicative of
anything.
A further difficulty is that the tort system has very high loading
costs. For every dollar that reaches an injured patient as a result of a tort
claim, almost two dollars are spent getting it there. The magnitude of the
expense is not surprising. Malpractice lawsuits involve complex issues,
expert witnesses, large damages, and, often, multiple defendants. By
comparison to other tort suits, they also last a long time. All these factors
300

See, e.g., Peeples et al., supra, at 884 (reporting that in 34.3% of the cases in which a
malpractice carrier solicited external reviews, the reviewers disagreed);
301
F. Sloan et al, Suing for Medical Malpractice, supra, at 219.
302
F. Sloan et al, Suing for Medical Malpractice, supra, at 220 (“claimants tended to be
undercompensated, and the fraction of loss recovered tended to be less for the most
severe injuries and for deaths, in particular for infants”).
303
Id.
304
A team of Harvard researchers described the system as “sending as confusing a signal
as would our traffic laws if the police regularly gave out more tickets to drivers who go
through green lights than to those who go through red lights.” Measure of Malpractice,
supra note **, at 75. To be sure, there is a substantial “base rate” problem with this
metaphor. Because the vast majority of drivers don’t go through red lights, even a small
error rate in writing tickets will result in precisely this outcome. See Saks, supra note **,
at 714.
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tend to increase litigation costs.305 Malpractice lawsuits also affect health
care providers’ reputations and endanger their licenses. Consequently,
malpractice cases tend to be hard fought, even when liability is fairly
clear.306
In theory, high litigation costs could have mixed effects. They
could weaken the tort system’s signal for quality by discouraging
plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing cases into the system. They could also
strengthen the signal by making errors that do reach the system more
expensive to defend. Although good empirical evidence is lacking, the
first effect seems to outweigh the second. Litigation costs have exerted
little pressure to improve because, historically, insurance carriers,
hospitals, and physicians have passed these costs onto patients and the
public by charging higher premiums and fees.307
Finally, one must consider the impact malpractice insurance has on
providers’ incentives. Malpractice insurance for health care professionals
is rarely risk-rated.308 Premiums vary by specialty, geography, and a few
other variables, but they do not reflect individual providers’ loss
experiences. The failure to risk-rate insurance may well be rational, but it
further limits the ability of the tort system to send a deterrent signal to
physicians about the consequences of their actions – let alone the
implications of their failing to adequately invest in patient safety
measures.309
The problems discussed to this point—under-claiming, erroneous
denials of compensation, under-compensation of patients with severe
injuries, high litigation costs, and distortions attributable to malpractice
305

See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 2073 (2002).
See Peeples et al., Who Are Those Guys? (finding that insurers routinely made
plaintiffs demonstrate the merit of their cases even when insurers’ thought liability was
clear).
307
See Patricia M. Danzon, Mark V. Pauly & R. S. Kington, The Effects of Malpractice
Litigation on Physicians’ Fees and Incomes, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 122, 125 (1990).
William Sage argues that providers have found it harder to pass on premium increases in
recent years. William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 Health Affairs
26, 29 (Aug. 2003). If Sage is right, one should see a variety of reactions as providers
seek to lower their costs, including marginal improvements in health care safety resulting
from increased implementation of efficient patient protections.
308
Previous attempts to impose experience rating have been unsuccessful, as physicians
have simply switched to insurers offering non-experience rated coverage. See Frank A.
Sloan, Experience Rating: Does it make sense for medical malpractice insurance?, 80
Am. Econ. Rev. 128 (1990). On experience rating for medical malpractice coverage
more generally, see Gary M. Fournier & Melanie M. McInnes, The Case For Experience
Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Investigation, 68 J. Risk &
Insur. (2001)
309
But see Hyman, supra note * at ** (noting rise of risk-rated malpractice insurance in
Texas.
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insurance—would limit the effectiveness of tort law even if civil justice
processes made full compensation available to all negligently injured
patients. In fact, civil justice processes are not so generous. Waves of tort
reform have made it harder for patients with valid claims to obtain
compensation and have limited the amounts they can recover.
Tort reform has taken a variety of forms. The most prevalent type
is a cap on non-economic damages (pain and suffering), which is usually
not indexed for inflation. Other proposals include screening panels,
mandatory ADR, caps on contingent fees, collateral source offsets,
requirements relating to expert reports and expert witnesses, and the like.
In general, tort reforms make malpractice cases more expensive, riskier,
and less rewarding for claimants and their lawyers, e.g. by requiring expert
reports as a condition for filing claims, by capping damages or fees, or by
making claimants endure additional burdens like screening panels or ADR
processes before going to trial. They also make malpractice claims less
expensive for defendants by reducing their frequency, by weakening
plaintiffs’ bargaining positions, by decreasing the willingness of plaintiffs’
attorneys to bear costs, or by giving defendants credit for payments
claimants receive from other sources.
For deterrence purposes, the impacts of tort reform on both sides
matter. On the claimant’s side, it is well known that economic incentives
influence the behavior of plaintiff’s lawyers. Because these lawyers work
for contingent fees and have to bear large expenses, they prefer cases
involving serious injuries, large damages, and clear liability.310 Patients
have trouble finding representation when their injuries are small or their
damages are small, which, in the case of the elderly and the poor, may be
true even when injuries are severe. Patients also find it hard to hire
lawyers when it is unclear whether their treatment violated the standard of
care. Empirical studies have found that plaintiffs’ attorneys who handle
malpractice cases are highly selective.311
310

Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to file Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359 (1992) (“Unless claims are
large enough, plaintiffs’ lawyers, paid by contingency fees, will not think them worth the
effort.”).
311
See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Role of Contingent Fee
Lawyers, Wis. Law., Mar. 1997, at 10, 63; Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers
As Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 Judicature 22, 24 (1997). See also Henry
S. Faber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the
Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. Econ. 199, 200 (1991) (arguing "[t]he contingency fee
system gives plaintiffs' lawyers a strong incentive to screen prospective plaintiffs and to
accept only cases having sufficiently high expected value").
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By making cases riskier and less rewarding, tort reforms
discourage contingent fee lawyers from taking cases. For this reason, tort
reforms reduce the incentive for providers to invest in measures that
protect patients from harm and exercise due care in their treatments. Tort
reforms that make malpractice cheaper for defendants by reducing the
frequency of lawsuits or the amounts defendants must pay to resolve them
have the same economic effect.
C.

MAKING THE TORT SYSTEM WORK BETTER

Medical providers want to abolish the tort system. Trial lawyers
want to keep it. Neither side is likely to win a complete victory. Policy
debate should therefore focus on accommodations that further the
legitimate interests of both and that, above all, encourage improvements
that protect patients from preventable harms. We discuss certain
possibilities here.
All of these proposals are necessarily quite preliminary, and they
are likely to require modification in light of market developments and
difficulties with implementation. Yet all have the singular virtue of
creating incentives for providers to “do the right thing,” by encouraging
error reporting and the use of those reports to actually address the problem
of low quality care.
1.

Make the Market Work Better

As explained above, strong economic forces provide the overriding
impetus for quality improvement in most industrial sectors. The simple
fact that producers profit by meeting customers’ needs creates enormous
pressure to treat customers well.
When markets work well, civil justice systems can safely play a
minor role in quality improvement. Their main purpose can be to ensure a
degree of civility and respect in economic relationships by taking the
roughest edges off disagreements that buyers and sellers cannot work out
on their own.312
In the health care sector, market forces subject providers to little
economic pressure to improve. Consequently, quality problems abound
and courts are asked to exert greater pressure for quality than they
normally do. Even in theory, it is difficult for courts to play so large a
role. Markets cause quality to improve automatically by encouraging
producers to generate new knowledge and changing their processes as
312

A distinguishing feature of highly developed capitalist economies is an ethic of
honesty and fair dealing between buyers and sellers. There is reason to think courts
contribute to the development and persistence of this ethic. Comparative studies show a
positive correlation between economic growth and easy access by businesses to honest
courts. See Frank Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 Tex. L. Rev. (2002).
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knowledge grows. Courts decide malpractice cases on the basis of old
knowledge (that may or may not be reliable) that has been incorporated
into a standard of care (that may or may not be efficient). Courts are
therefore inherently limited in what they can do.
The first prescription for improving health care quality must
therefore be to increase the strength of market forces. The highest priority
should be given to arrangements that enhance providers’ incentives by
tying their compensation to measurable improvements in outcomes and
that enable patients to distinguish between superior and inferior providers
effectively.313 To restore the ex post tort system to its proper role, we
should place more emphasis on ex ante contracts between payers, patients,
and providers.
2.

Allow Premiums for Malpractice Insurance to
Rise

The history of anesthesia safety suggests that providers react in
economically rational ways to changes in premiums for malpractice
insurance. Anesthesiologists studied their delivery systems and improved
them because it saved them money overall. At the time, anesthesiologists’
insurance premiums were considerably higher than those paid by many
other physicians.
By reducing morbidity and mortality rates,
anesthesiologists protected millions of patients from avoidable harms, cut
the number of malpractice complaints, and saved money on insurance.
Anesthesiology is the only medical practice area to achieve
reliability rates that rival those of high quality producers in other
industries. The persons most responsible for its improvement openly
admit that lowering malpractice premiums was an important objective.
The lesson for policy makers is that rising insurance rates can encourage
health care providers to make desirable improvements. The lesson is also
that litigation rates and premiums will fall on their own when providers
improve the quality of care.
Policy makers should therefore resist the urge to rescue providers
from premium increases by capping damages or otherwise impeding the
tort system’s ability to shift the costs of malpractice from patients to
providers. By doing nothing, policy makers may achieve significant
results in a short time.314 Anesthesia safety improved dramatically and
quickly after the ASA promulgated guidelines for patient monitoring.
Insurers reduced premiums for anesthesiologists soon thereafter, as their
313
314

See Hyman & Silver, supra note * at **.
Cf. David A. Hyman, ** (“Don’t just do something; sit there”)
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performance improved. If policy makers had intervened, e.g., by capping
malpractice premiums for anesthesiologists or limiting their liability to
patients, the incentive to address the underlying quality problems would
have diminished.
The improvements anesthesiologists implemented in the 1980s
have had staying power. Unlike rates for other medical professionals,
anesthesiologists’ insurance premiums have remained relatively flat,
reflecting the fact that anesthesia delivery continues to be safe. A
plausible hypothesis is that the pro-quality attitudes and institutions
anesthesiologists created took hold, fostering a culture of safety with a life
of its own. If policy makers allow insurance rates to rise for other
providers, they will feel pressure to develop similar attitudes and
institutions, and the culture of medicine may forever be changed.
3.

Use Caps on Non-Economic Damages to Reward
Error Reporting and Error Reduction

To encourage voluntary error reporting, an obvious strategy is to
reward providers for making reports and punish them for hiding mistakes.
We propose that a cap on non-economic damages be used for this purpose.
Although many states have imposed such caps already, they have not used
them as we propose because their object was to limit insurance costs, not
to improve health care quality. States with caps thus missed an
opportunity to encourage providers to make improvements that would
protect patients and cause insurance costs to decline naturally.
When a provider reports an error within a specified time of its
occurrence, we proposed that the provider receive the protection of a limit
on non-economic damages. The limit could take many forms, e.g., a flat
cap, a sliding scale tied to the amount of economic damages awarded, or a
percentage reduction against an eventual trial award. When a provider
fails to report an error in a timely manner, we propose that non-economic
damages be enhanced. Again, many arrangements are possible. A floor
could be set, a trial verdict could have a multiplier applied, etc.
Using a combination of carrots and sticks should increase error
reporting greatly. Today, health care workers who know about errors
rarely have incentives to report them because error reduction benefits
neither their employers nor them. The possibility of reducing damage
awards to injured patients would pressure providers to reward workers for
conveying useful information. Because providers with functioning errorreporting systems would also face less liability, insurance companies
could also offer them lower premiums. Insurers might even make the
existence of error-reporting practices a condition for extending coverage.
The rewards and punishments we propose could have collateral
benefits as well. First, by reporting errors and gaining the benefit of the
cap, providers would reduce the variance associated with malpractice
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claims. This should make malpractice cases easier to settle and to insure.
The floor on non-economic damages should reduce the variance as well.
Second, because the fact of having made a report would have to be public
(at least to the extent of being revealed to the trial court), information
about providers’ error reporting practices would be produced. Employers,
consumer groups, and others could use this information when rating
providers or deciding whether to include them in networks.
The possibility of rewarding providers for reporting errors raises
two important questions: what should they report and to whom? There are
many options. Choices among them should be made on the basis of their
tendency to promote quality improvement.
An option that seems especially attractive would be to require
providers to participate in quality surveys like those run by The Leapfrog
Group. Providers of lesser quality tend to withdraw from these surveys in
disproportionate numbers. Yet, if malpractice claims track the frequency
of errors, these providers also stand to gain the most from damages caps.
Consequently, the incentive for them to participate in quality surveys
would increase dramatically.
Tying the damages cap to participation in third party surveys
would also create the option of rewarding providers for improving their
quality survey “scores” over time. This could be accomplished by
creating a second cap (and lower) cap on non-economic damages that
becomes available when measurable improvements in quality targets are
achieved.
Rewarding providers for improving their quality survey “scores”
would also address a second problem. Error reporting is a necessary
condition for improvement but not a sufficient one. Providers have known
all along about some of the problems outlined in this article, but many
have not put their knowledge to use because they find it cheaper and easier
to allow errors to occur than to prevent them. To harmonize medical
liability and patient safety, it is as critical to create incentives to use
knowledge appropriately as to reward providers for accumulating
information.
4.

Reward Health Care Workers for Reporting
Problems

Under-claiming, which weakens the deterrent signal sent by the
tort system, is inherently difficult to fix. Although one often hears that
Americans are excessively litigious, most of us are exceedingly reluctant
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to sue.315 Most of us also cannot easily tell whether we received proper
care. Finally, most injuries stemming from medical errors also are too
small to justify the high cost of malpractice litigation. The tendency of
first-party health care payers to share these costs also waters down
patients’ incentives. The prospects for increasing the claim rate are dim.
Given this difficulty, one must consider the possibility of allowing
people other than patients to sue. Health care workers are the obvious
candidates. They are more likely than patients to know about errors and
faulty delivery systems. They may also know when health care providers
are ignoring shortcomings instead of correcting them. Finally, they may
be professionally motivated or obligated to protect patients.
Health care workers lack standing to file malpractice suits. They
can complain to regulators, however, but they are not rewarded for doing
so.316 Consequently, it is more profitable for them to participate in the
“conspiracy of silence” that allows errors to continue than to report them.
A qui tam approach, loosely based on that found in the False
Claims Act (FCA),317 could create substantial incentives for employees to
come forward. The approach we envision would reward workers for
reporting problems to administrative agencies or third party quality
monitors by paying them liquidated bonuses. The reports would be
confidential, to ameliorate employees’ fear of reprisal. Providers that,
upon investigation, are found to have sub-par systems in place would be
penalized. These penalties would fund the reporting employees’ rewards.
Because the penalties would be fines rather than civil damages, they
would not be covered by insurance.
Small bonuses would probably generate significant information
about seriously deficient health care providers without giving employees
incentives to abuse the process, e.g., by lodging complaints after being
discharged. If proponents of the conventional wisdom are right, many
health care workers are looking for safe ways to reveal errors and pressure
their employers to improve. These employees may fear reprisal on the job
as much as or more than they fear litigation. The approach we envision
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International comparisons reveal that on a per capita basis Americans are less likely to
sue than Germans, Swedes, Israelis, and Austrians, and about as likely to sue as Britons
and Danes. See Herbert M. Kritzer, 80 Tex. L. Rev. xxx (2002) (reprinting figure
comparing per capita litigation rates in diverse countries).
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For a recent example of an investigation triggered by a report filed by a whistleblowing employee, see Associated Press, Patients May have Gotten Wrong HIV Results,
Mar. 11, 2004 (reporting that, because of a complaint filed by a former employee, state
health officials discovered that a hospital’s laboratory personnel overrode controls in
testing equipment and mailed possibly erroneous test results to hundreds of patients).
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would give employees with valuable information an opportunity to reveal
it without putting their jobs on the line.
Again, the questions of what to report and to whom must be
addressed. It probably makes more sense to rely on independent quality
monitors than on public agencies like state medical boards. The latter
have proven to be incapable of policing quality effectively. The entities
that are leading the campaign for quality are the ones most likely to resist
being captured by providers and to give complaints the attention they
deserve.318
A complementary approach that would also use a qui tam strategy
would allow employees to bring malpractice cases on behalf of patients.
The statute of limitations on such cases should only start running after the
individual plaintiff has had a reasonable amount of time to bring a case on
his own behalf. One could also allow employees to file qui tam cases
immediately and for liquidated damage amounts when injuries are too
small to justify contingent fee lawsuits, as frequently is true. All of these
strategies have the potential to address the under-claiming that makes
malpractice cheaper for providers than it should be.
5.

Recognize Evidence-Based Medicine as an
Absolute Defense

Physicians complain bitterly that their conduct is subject to
second-guessing by know-nothing juries and judges. To the extent
physicians render care that meets consensus standards of quality, there is
no reason to subject them to liability or to devote legal resources to such
cases. Although there are obvious difficulties associated with the
development of consensus standards, physicians who adhere to those
standards should be immune from suit.319 As noted previously, physicians
express fear and loathing about the prospect of being sued. If physicians
fear malpractice as much as they say they do, the prospect of immunity
should be an immediate incentive for the implementation of these
standards.
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See Kelly J. Devers, Hoangmai H. Pham, and Gig Liu, What Is Driving Hospitals’
Patient-Safety Efforts, 23 Health Affairs 103, 105 (Apr. 2004) (“hospitals’ major patientsafety initiatives are primarily intended to meet JCAHO requirements”).
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Swords and Shields: The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 645 (2000).
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6. Require Repeat Defendants to Undergo Quality
Audits and Publicize the Results

A relatively small fraction of all physicians account for a
disproportionate share of malpractice claims, settlements, and judgments.
Targeting reform efforts against those who are most responsible for the
problem is an efficient use of limited resources. Rather than wait for
malpractice claims to be brought, state licensing boards and the hospitals
at which repeat defendants have privileges should be required to conduct
prospective quality audits and publicize the results of those audits. Even if
the audits do not result in any disciplinary action or limitation of
privileges, the act of publicizing the quality audits should alone create
considerable incentives for repeat defendant physicians to correct their
deficiencies or find another line of work.
VIII. Conclusion
Patient safety advocates have made strong and unqualified claims
about the deleterious impact of medical liability on the performance of the
health care system. Although their claims are plausible, the best available
evidence does not support them. Liability appears to make a modest
positive contribution to patient safety overall, accounts for significant
improvements in anesthesia safety, encourages providers to solve specific
problems at specific health care institutions, and causes physicians to be
more forthcoming in conversations with patients.320
Many providers have failed to adopt patient safety measures of
proven effectiveness, and they have similarly failed to use information
already in their possession to protect patients from harm.321 Given that
320
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providers subject to liability for negligence behave in this fashion, it is
absurd to think they would voluntarily spend hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars implementing patient safety initiatives if the threat of
liability were removed. Optimism about providers’ likely responses to
hortatory appeals to “do the right thing” should be distinguished from piein-the-sky Pollyannaism.
The conventional wisdom simply assumes this problem away.322 It
is naïve to think that progress on the patient safety front would occur
automatically if the threat of liability were removed.323 Providers are (all
else being equal) more likely to attend to problems that are sources of
liability than to problems for which the costs are externalized.324 Indeed,
as Professor Bill Sage has noted, “innovation that improves safety often
happens in the shadow of liability.”325
These observations do not mean that the arguments raised by
patient safety advocates should be ignored. Medical liability is an
extraordinarily inefficient mechanism for encouraging the delivery of high
quality care and for transferring resources from negligent providers to
injured patients. A strategy that uses the economic self-interest of
providers to address the problems raised by patient safety advocates has
more chance of succeeding than one that either relies on the legal system
exclusively or eliminates tort regulation and puts nothing in its place.
Useful approaches would harness all available forces—including
market-based incentives, legal liability, and health care workers’
professionalism—to address these problems. Firms in other industrial
sectors have created non-punitive environments in which workers can
actually [be] used to improve medication safety. For example, more than a quarter of
respondents (29%) said they had not collected and used information about pharmacy
interventions to correct prescribing errors.”).
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the threat of malpractice litigation is the problem, blocking discussion and disclosure of
errors and thus preventing system improvements to decrease future errors. Don’t spook
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report problems without fear of recrimination or reprisal, despite being
subject to external liability threats (or even because of these threats).326
For these firms, the benefit of providing higher quality goods and services
exceeds the associated cost, and non-punitive internal reporting systems
provide the information needed to drive that outcome. Health care
organizations can create such environments if they are truly committed to
providing high quality care.327
Patient safety advocates are also right in arguing that the health
care sector needs a cultural transformation.
Suppose that an airline’s managers and pilots repeatedly
resisted installing collision-avoidance systems despite solid
evidence of their worth.
Suppose, too, that they
complained that the radar was not reimbursed adequately,
required inconvenient retraining, provided no competitive
advantage in attracting passengers at a time when airline
profits were low, and (sotto voce) was an insult to pilot
judgment. No one would blithely blame “airline culture”
for an ensuing disaster, and no one would absolve
individual pilots and managers of responsibility for that
disaster simply because they never intended for passengers
to be harmed.328
Health care providers make arguments like these all the time, and they
expect them to be taken seriously. Better evidence of attitudes antithetical
to patient safety would be hard to find.
Bad attitudes persist because providers have bad incentives. A
world in which health care providers profit by making mistakes is a world
in which they will find reasons for allowing high error rates to persist. No
rational system of compensation rewards an agent for making a principal
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worse off.329 Unless and until these incentive problems are corrected,
patients will continue to receive low quality care, and medical errors will
continue to beset our system of health care delivery.

329

Hyman & Silver, supra note , at .

